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9Abstract
The world of sport has recently been inundated by stories of doping. These reports
are not limited to a select few individuals or sports, but seemingly are spread across
sports. At first, it was mostly members of the sports community voicing their discontent,
but soon actors outside of the sports community, such as government committees,
became interested. Anti-doping policies were created to reduce doping; however, these
policies were created independently of government and vary in effectiveness. The most
visible variances are between professional and amateur sports.
Accordingly, this paper investigates why there is variation between professional
and amateur anti-doping policies. This investigation is done in a qualitative fashion and
employs the Most Similar System of Design (a comparative method) to identify that
factors result in the differences. The paper also contributes to the field by creating and
organizing the ethics of doping. Furthermore, it compares the various existing approaches
to anti-doping policy by analysing the anti-doping policies of the PGA, IOC, WADA, and
the MLB. Subsequently, the paper identifies seven obstacles facing anti-doping regulators
and identifies new policy tools that could aid anti-doping policies. Finally, it closes with
policy recommendations for the future. This paper is comprehensive: it introduces the
topic of anti-doping, the subsequent definitions, explains the ethical considerations,
answers why there is variation between professional and amateur anti-doping policies,
and provides policy recommendations.
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Chapter I:
Introduction
The influence of sport can be illustrated in many different ways. Financially, sport
is mega-business; for example, elite baseball players in MLB earn over US$20 million a
year (as is the case with Alex Rodriguez). Furthermore, endorsement contracts can
further add to a player’s income, thereby allowing the most marketable players to earn in
excess of US$100 annually1 (Forbes 2007). Socially, sport is so influential that is
terminology has work its way into our vernacular. Phrases like “coming down the home-
stretch” and “swinging for the fence” are commonly used as metaphors. Furthermore,
sport has the power to influence societies ethics, morals and behaviour. One only needs to
look as far as their local playground to see a child emulating their favourite sports hero.
Since sport has this power, regulators both public and private, must ensure it is a positive
influence on society.
What is interesting with regard to political science is that sport has largely been
left to self-regulate. Self-regulation has had some positive effects with the construction of
international governing bodies that oversee competition. These international bodies
typically function with a chivalrous or romantic ethical code, where sportsmanship and
fair play is paramount. However, self-regulation has also provided the opportunity for
private sports associations to overlook some ethical concerns in order to increase profits.
Perhaps the most dangerous of these concerns is doping.
Although some perceive doping as a problem localized among a few rogue elite
athletes, this is not the case. Due to the pressure to remain competitive, doping has
worked its way down into the college and high school levels. It is reported that 3.5% of
all high school seniors in the US have at least tried performance enhancing substances
                                                 
1 For example, Tiger Woods reportedly earns US$90 million annually in tournament
winnings and endorsement deals (Forbes 2007).
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(PESs) (US Senate [108-814] 2004: 11). What is even more frightening is many of these
athletes are using them secretly with no monitoring. This has led to many health
problems and deaths of young athletes. We are now living in a society where young
athletes are literally dying to improve their athletic performance.
Exacerbating the problem is conflicting information of PESs; some substances
that are used to increase the performance of athletes also have application in medicine.
For example, steroids are used in medicine to treat AIDs patients; and, EPO (a red-blood
cell booster) is used to treat anaemia (Sokolove 2004: 32). Furthermore, society is plain
and simply ignorant about PESs. In a recent study, it was found that 45% of all 12th
graders did not believe that steroids posed a great health risk (University of Michigan in
Senate Hearing 108-814 2004: 11).
 Not only does society not understand the risks of PESs, but the legal status of
PESs has created a sinister black market. Former body-builder and D-I athlete Curtis A.
Wenzlaff testified in front of Congress that users are rarely getting high quality steroids.
Wenzlaff, who received a comprehensive education of steroids when working-out in
Southern California Gyms, estimates that 95% of anabolic steroids are fake (Wenzlaff in
US Senate [108-814] 2004: 38). Other experts warn that many of these “fake steroids”
are contain questionable substances such as sesame and motor oil. Wenzlaff paints an
accurate portrait of PESs in his testimony: PESs such as steroids can be used with relative
low risk when taken in low doses and controlled conditions. The problem is most PES
use is unmonitored and behind closed doors.
The policies that have been created to control these policies vary in approach and
effectiveness. Most amateur and international sports associations conduct random testing,
research emerging doping techniques, and have substantial penalties (at least a year,
typically two) for doping infractions. On the other hand, professional sports associations,
such as the major sports associations of the United States (the National Football League
(NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA) and Major League Baseball (MLB))
are more lenient with doping penalties. For example, MLB has only had a formal anti-
doping policy since 2003 and a first time offence results in a 50 game suspension
(roughly 1/3 of a season). This is in contrast to the Olympic standard, which is 2 years for
a first infraction (Bodley 2005; WADA 2005).
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Political Science and Anti-Doping Policy
Since anti-doping policy is a new field of political science, it is useful to examine
why it is a worthy area of study. The following section explains the connections between
political science and anti-doping policy: these connections become more obvious as the
paper progresses. There are four main ties between anti-doping policy and political
science: economics, politics, health, and moral influence.
Economics
Sport has obvious economic implications. The estimated value for some
professional sports franchises in the US has passed the US$1 billion (Forbes 2007)2.
Secondly, the advertising in sport has grown to extraordinary heights over the past
decades. For example, “the global television fees for the 1980 Moscow games were US
$101 million, increasing to US$287 million for the 1984 Los Angeles Games. The fee has
increased substantially at every subsequent summer Olympics, and the estimated fee for
the TV rights for the 2004 Athens Olympics is US$1,498 million” (BMA 2002: 83).
Another example is the cost of a 30-second commercial at the 2005 Super Bowl (NFL)
was US$2.4 million (Crawford 2005). Not only are franchises valuable, but also athletes
themselves are getting paid an extraordinary amount. Most professional athletes in the
United States get paid several million of dollars a year. An extreme case is Tiger Woods,
who is paid US$97.6 million a year in winnings and endorsements (Freedman 2006).
Also relating to anti-doping policy, the sports nutritional supplement market is
booming. It is estimated that last year Americans spent more than US$4 billion on dietary
supplements designed for sport performance (Carroll 2005: 80). At an individual level, it
is estimated that top college athletes spend US $1,000 a month on dietary supplements
(ibid: 80). In order to combat the spread of PESs, anti-doping associations spend between
US$80,000 to $400,000 per instrument to test for dopers (Black in Carroll 2005: 103).
When all of equipment is added, the cost of an anti-doping testing facility is
approximately US$3 million (Cashmore 2000: 203). Because of the human and financial
                                                 
2 For example, the New York Yankees (MLB) are valued at US$1.2 billion (Forbes
2007).
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capital involved in sport, it is important for federal regulators and sports associations to
ensure that sports remain economically viable.
Politics
The link between politics and sport occurs in three ways: governments use sport
to promote nationalism; governments use sport as leverage in international relations; and
there are now governmental policies that control doping. Firstly, sport is a tool that
politicians use as political leverage. For example, the President of the United States
customary throws the first pitch of the MLB season. Internationally, King Chulalongkorn
of Thailand adopted soccer as the national sport in an effort to boost nationalism,
solidarity, and promote his position of power (Ockey 2004). In New Zealand, the national
rugby team (the All Blacks) is so influential that it has been proposed that New Zealand’s
national flag be replaced with the All Blacks’ silver fern logo (www.nzflag.com 2007).
Secondly, sport has been used as political leverage in international relations; for example,
Jimmy Carter and the United States Olympic Committee decided to boycott the 1980
Summer Olympics in Moscow because of a Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Eventually
44 other nations joined the United States in the boycott. The USSR responded by
boycotting the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles citing “a hostile and anti-
communist environment” (The History Channel: 2005). Finally, sport and politics are
directly linked via Acts of Congress. Traditionally, anti-doping policy was under the
complete jurisdiction of the independent sporting associations; however, that has since
changed; for example, in October of 2004, President Bush signed into law the Anabolic
Steroid Control Act (of 2004). Ratified by the US Congress, the bill expanded the steroid
law of 1990. The new law also provides “US$15 million for education programs for
children about the dangers of anabolic steroids, and directs the U.S. sentencing
commission to consider revising federal guidelines to increase the penalties for steroid
possession and distribution” (Collins in Carroll 2005: 180-1).
Health
Sport is unique because it combines exercise (a means of combating preventable
diseases) with socializing (each sport typically has its own community and ethos). To
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pick an example, aerobics provides both exercise and a place to socialize for participants.
Since sport combines these two forms of wellness, it is important that regulators monitor
sport so society does not become disenfranchised and stop using this valuable resource.
Relating to doping, there are many severe health consequences associated with
PESs. There are many PESs related fatalities in both professional and amateur athletics
that draw the attention of political scientists and regulators. For example, there is the
death of Tyler Hooton, a high school baseball player who committed suicide due to a
steroid-related depression; and, the premature death of former NFL-All Pro Lyle Alzado
who attributed his career-ending Achilles tendon injury and subsequent death to brain
cancer to steroids; and finally, there is the premature death of Florence Joyner-Kersey,
also a steroid related death (Carroll 2005: 7,110). The health benefits associated with
sport and the health risks associated with PESs certainly validate the attention of
regulators and political scientists.
Moral Influence
The final area that political science, sport and anti-doping policy overlap is
morality. This takes place on two levels. Firstly, sport has the power to morally influence
society, as illustrated by younger athletes mimicking the behaviour of professionals.
Secondly, sport provides an avenue of social mobility and is the aspirations of many
individuals. These criteria make it important to regulate sport so it remains virtuous in
they eyes of the sporting community. The following two sections illuminate these
characteristics of sport:
Aspirations / Social Mobility
Dreaming of success is important because it gives an individual purpose and
direction. Although not everyone aspires to be a career athlete, sport provides a
community that many seek to belong. Sport also is an environment where people can
combine talent and determination to achieve success, thus relating to the Heratio Alger
myth and the “American Dream”3. Miah (2004) states that the reason why sports are
appealing and interesting is because of “the non-elitism of many sports, which appear to
                                                 
3 Simply put, the Heratio Alger myth embodies the rags to riches myth.
15
be an accessible opportunity to succeed and receive rewards, regardless of social class”
(Miah 2004: 60). Because of the aspirations that are associated with sport, it is important
that policy makers and political scientists ensure that society does not become
disillusioned with sport.
Ethics
The argument over whether or not sport is ethical is long and heated. On one
hand, there are those who believe that sport is unethical and would agree with George
Orwell who said, “Serious sport has nothing to do with fair play. It is bound up with
hatred, jealousy, boastfulness, and disregard of all the rules” (Ratcliffe 2001). On the
other end of the spectrum are supporters who would agree with the philosopher Albert
Camus, who said, “What I know most surely about morality and the duty of man, I owe
to sport” (Ratcliffe 2001). These two quotations demonstrate the scope of appreciation
for sport: it may be seen as a positive or negative moral influence. Advocates of sport
would typically argue that discipline, teamwork and respect are three examples of
positive sports morals. This could be countered by arguing that corruption and greed have
tarnished those lessons.
Although the question of athletics being an appropriate source of ethical and
moral teachings is contestable, sport certainly has moral influence over society. Because
of this influence, regulators and political scientists need to address sport.
Why is Anti-Doping Policy Important to Political Science?
Before moving on, one must explain why anti-doping policy is important to
political science. As previously discussed, sport has the ability to influence many of the
cornerstones of society, such as economics, politics, and physical and psychological
health. Although it is unclear what effect the permeation of PESs might have on sport,
one would suspect that any change experienced in sport will resonate through society. In
a best-case scenario, doping in sport would have little effect on how the aforementioned
fields function; however, this scenario is unlikely in sport-fixated countries like the
United States. In this case, where society relies on sport economically, politically,
physically (in regard to health) and psychologically, an increase of doping in sport could
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potentially have catastrophic effects. If doping reached a point where citizens became
disenchanted with sport, societies could lose a principle source of income, entertainment,
mode of exercise, and code of ethics. It is because of these implications that regulators
and political scientists need to analyze the impact of doping on society and develop
methods to control the problem.
Literature Review
In order to identify how this paper contributes to the field of anti-doping policy,
the key works within the field must be discussed. Interestingly, little has been written on
anti-doping from a policy perspective. Reasons such as, the recent emergence of the topic
and the history of token anti-doping policies have left the policy surrounding doping
largely and undiscussed topic. However, now that anti-doping policies are getting more
media and governmental attention, one would suspect that the topic should experience an
increase in publications. To date, most of the literature written on anti-doping has
discussed the ethics of doping rather than critiquing the methods of policy. With this in
mind, the following introduces key authors and titles in the field of anti-doping. This
provides a reference point for where anti-doping places in relation to other public policy
fields and highlights where there are gaps in the literature.
Media Sources
Unlike most subjects of political science, the group that has been most interested
in anti-doping policy is the media. This is expected considering the media’s close
relationship with sport. Although the media had certainly mentioned doping previously,
anti-doping policy was really driven to the forefront with the believed relationship
between homeruns and steroids during the early 2000s.
During this time, popular sports magazines, such as Sports Illustrated, started
conducting a number of features on doping. One of these features was Gary Smith’s
Steroids and Baseball: What Do We Do Now? (2005) In this article, Smith interviews a
number of members of the baseball community (including fans, players, and regulators).
Although it is mainly anecdotal, the article highlighted some interesting arguments. For
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example, Dr. Greg Scott argues that just because elite baseball players take steroids does
not mean they will automatically hit more homeruns. Scott argues that the hardest part of
hitting homeruns is reading the pitch and making contact (Scott in Smith 2005: 48).
Another interesting argument was made in reference to a fans perception of the
credibility of the records made by doped athletes. Michael Barnes (the broker for
McGwire’s Homerun ball No. 62) argues that the most memorable characteristic of those
summers when McGwire and Sosa were hitting all those homeruns was the joy he
experienced watching the games with his adolescent son (Barnes in Smith 2005: 44-5).
This opinion supports the argument that the entertainment and record-breaking is more
important than the methods used to break those records. There are countless other media
sources that discuss doping, and because of the medias tight relationship with sport, some
of them are insightful.
US Senate
United States Senate also contributed to the field with a string of hearings and
Federal Subpoenas. On July 13, 2004, the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control held a hearing titled: Abuse of Anabolic Steroids and Their Precursors By
Adolescent Amateur Athletes. The hearing is highlighted by the testimonies by a NCAA
D-I football player, a convicted steroid user, a father whose son committed suicide after
using steroids, and a Professor of Molecular and Medical Pharmacology. These
testimonies revealed that 95% of steroids used on the black market are “bad”4 and that
3.5% of high school seniors have tried steroids (US Senate [108-814] 2004: 3, 11); this
statistic, and venue which it was stated, certainly accredits anti-doping policy as an
academic discipline.
In 2005 the government issued a federal subpoena to MLB in order to get a better
understanding of the use of PESs in baseball. The individuals that were being questioned
included former and current baseball players, such as Sammy Sosa, Curt Schilling, and
Mark McGwire. The most interesting part of these testimonies was what was not said.
McGwire in particular seemed to carefully dodge questions with pre-rehearsed responses.
                                                 
4 “Bad” steroids are characterised by substances that are ineffective or excessively
damaging to ones health.
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Due to the unsettling information uncovered during these hearings, the US has
been constructing new policies to help control doping. Although the government has
allowed professional sports associations to continue to self-regulate, they have created
new policies such as the Anabolic Steroid Control Act [S. 2195], the Drug Free Sports
Act [H.R. 1862], and the Clean Sports Act [H.R. 2565].
The British Medical Association (BMA)
Another state-funded organization that has shown an interest in doping is British-
run BMA. In 2002, the BMA organized the publishing of text titled Drugs in Sport,
which collects the knowledge of many experts and predictably uncovers some fascinating
information. One chapter in particular, titled Policy Instruments to Prevent the Use of
Drugs In Sport skilfully outlines the ethical, legal and financial obstacles that hinder
effective anti-doping policy. The chapter continues by outlining some policy instruments
that could be used to improve policy. Although they list some of the obvious policy tools
like deterrence, education, and cutting off supplies (via barriers), they also have some
progressive ideas. One example is providing athletes with financial rewards for not
doping. Another is harm reduction policy, which works by providing athletes who choose
to dope with safe houses that have the resources for doping more healthfully (BMA 2002:
96-110).
Ellis Cashmore
Notable sport sociologist and anthropologist Ellis Cashmore has also made
contributions to the field of doping. Cashmore is significant because he thoroughly
discussed doping before it became visible to the public eye. In his 2000 book, Making
Sense of Sport, he outlines history, introduces the substances, and discusses doping
ethics.
In the history section, Cashmore highlights some of the most interesting doping
case studies. He discusses the cases of Thomas Hicks (an Olympic marathoner who in
1904 was doping with strychnine and brandy), Tommy Simpson (a 29 year-old cyclist
who died after taking amphetamines during the Tour de France in the 1960s), and Ben
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Johnson (a Canadian sprinter who was disqualified from the 1988 Olympics for using
Stanozolol) (Cashmore 2000: 191-5).
Cashmore also contributes by organizing PESs and discussing their ramifications:
Making Sense of Sport contains the interesting history of the development of steroids.
The text also explains the implications of substances such as stimulants, diuretics, EPO,
and hGH.
Cashmore’s final and perhaps more interesting contribution discusses the dubious
nature of testing for PESs. Cashmore discusses several cases, some where justice was
served, others where athletes where wrongly accused are rewarded with large settlements.
Also discussed is the ethics of Ben Johnson’s suspension for using Stanzolol in the 1988
Olympics. Interestingly, Johnson was suspended for using a dose that was less that what
the World Health Organization found safe for medicinal use as a male contraceptive.
(Cashmore 2000: 210). Cashmore continues his role of devil’s advocate by pointing out
that some sports (such as boxing) are more dangerous than PESs.
Andy Miah
Dr. Andy Miah of the University of Paisley in Scotland has been looking at the
ramifications of futuristic genetic doping techniques. In his 2004 book Genetically
Modified Athletes, Miah discusses three main topics: first, he discusses why his booking
is topical and why anti-doping policies exist; second, he discusses, what are the
possibilities of genetic performance enhancement; and third, he uses established ethical
paradigms to interpret the ethical status of gene doping.
Gene doping allows athletes to surpass current, crude forms of doping (where an
athlete typically increases overall muscle mass). Instead, gene doping allows the
possibility to only create virtuous fast-twitch muscle fibre. Also, genetic technology
allows owners of professional sports franchises to genetically screen for injury proneness.
Conversely, stem-cell therapy also allows athletes the possibility to repair or even
enhance injuries. This “Gattica-like” possibility has certainly caught the attention ethicist.
Finally, using germ-line therapy techniques, medicine could not only enhance one
individual but also could enhance all of the individual’s offspring. Finally, genetic PESs
allow an athlete to target specific areas of the body with little risk of side effects. The
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repercussions of genetic PESs make Miah an interesting contributor to the field of
doping.
Will Carroll
An informative source specific to MLB is Will Carroll’s, The Juice: The Real
Story of Baseball’s Drug Problems (2005). Carroll’s close relationship to MLB players
(he writes for Sports Illustrated and Baseball Prospectus) allows him to get unique
insights from dopers, regulators, and producers of PESs who traditionally remain quiet.
The most interesting of these interviews is with the creator of THG named Patrick
Arnold. Arnold explains that THG is an ingestible steroid that breaks down quickly when
removed from the body, which of course is the characteristic that made it undetectable.
Arnold’s name has been associated with BALCO, Victor Conte, Barry Bonds, Bill
Romanowski, and Marion Jones.
Carroll also writes about the abuse of amphetamines in MLB. Carroll states that
because of the hectic schedule of MLB, players often turn to “uppers” to maintain
performance. The problem is that amphetamines alter an athletes sleep-cycle, thus
perpetuation health problems. Many experts believe that the misuse of amphetamines is a
much larger problem in baseball than steroids.
Perhaps the most interesting debate that Carroll attacks is relationship between
PESs and MLB statistics. Although Carroll acknowledges that homeruns certainly
climbed during the “steroid-era”, he also argues that some other changes occurred in
MLB that could be equally responsible for the increase in homeruns. For example,
Carroll notes that many of the newer MLB stadiums have been producing more homeruns
due to altering boundaries (and a climb in elevation – a la Rockies). Furthermore, Carroll
explains that changes in the construction of baseballs could also be responsible for
affecting homeruns. Unsurprisingly, there is a low tolerance on the dimensions of MLB
baseballs; however, there is a surprisingly large tolerance for rebound: when MLB
baseballs are tested for quality (by being fired from a pitching machine at 85mph), they
must rebound 43.69 between 49.13mph (Carroll 2005: 222). That translates into 49.1 feet
of variance. Additionally, a number of MLB players and umpires have stated that the
texture, hardness, and seam-height of MLB baseballs have changed in recent years
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(Carroll 2005: 222-6). The bats used by MLB players have also changed: many players
are now using maple bats rather than the traditional ash. Maple is more dense and hardier
than ash, therefore maple bats are lighter with the same size sweet-spot (Carroll 2005:
227).
Purpose / Chapter Outline / Boundaries
The purpose of this thesis is to explain why anti-doping policies vary between
amateur and professional sport. In doing so, the Most Similar Systems Method of Design
(MSS or MSSD) is used to establish amateur and professional sport as similar regulatory
fields. Subsequently, factors such as sport philosophy, sport finance, and sport
management are used as independent variables to explain why such different anti-doping
policies result from similar regulatory fields.
To date, little has been written on why there is variance among anti-doping
policies. This could be for a number of reasons: firstly, although anti-doping policy has
been apart of Olympic sport since 1961, it has only been within the past decade that it
professional sports have had anything more than token anti-doping policies. Therefore, it
has been impossible to compare professional and amateur anti-doping policies until a few
years ago.
Secondly, private professional sports associations have historically been secretive
about their anti-doping policies. In fact, when the government subpoenaed MLB in 2005,
they had to request MLB’s anti-doping policy because they could not locate it. Even to
date, it is difficult to MLBs anti-doping policy: when I tried to locate it during the course
of this paper, they requested that I formally apply, then my application would be subject
to review, and then they would send me the document if it was approved. However, to be
fair, some of the major sports associations are upfront with their anti-doping policies, and
those policies of the NFL and NBA can be found in the player’s collective bargaining
agreements on the Internet. Because some professional sports association have been
secretive with their anti-doping polices, it has been difficult to investigate the area.
A final reason why there exists this gap in the literature of anti-doping policy is
many authors are still familiarizing themselves with the subject. Most of the literature
that was discovered in the course of the paper was factual. In other words, most current
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literature focuses on what anti-doping policies state or the weaknesses of the policies;
however, few sources explain what factors influence the shaping of anti-doping policies.
This is the aim of this paper.
In order to be able to achieve the purpose, one must explain the context in which
the field operates. Accordingly, the second chapter explains definitions, describes history,
and outlines ethical considerations. This exercise grants the reader the ability to interpret
and analyze the field of anti-doping policy. Chapter Three progresses by introducing the
theory and method. Chapter Four discusses factors that create variance in anti-doping
policy and proposes alternatives and addenda to current policy. Chapter Five provides a
conclusion to the paper and an appendix is added to provide additional information
As for boundaries, the paper is written qualitatively and largely founded on peer-
reviewed works and government documents. The topic focuses on American anti-doping
policy since most existing literature is focused in this area; however, many of the
conclusions can be broadened to fit other contexts.
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Chapter II:
The Field of Anti-Doping
Policy
Section 1: Sport
Before discussing anti-doping policy, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss what
separates the activity of “sport” from “play”. One needs to understand what defines a
sport before being able to analyse the policies that influence it.
Definitions
The word “sport” is derived from the Latin root “desporto”, meaning “to carry
away” (Leonard II 1980:12). As for definitions of sport, there are a number of theories
that distinguish sport from games and play. Coakley defines sport by three factors: the
types of activities involved; the structure of the context in which the activities take place;
and, the participants orientations (Leonard II 1980:12). Conversely, McPherson et al.
(1989) defines sport by five characteristics: sport is structured, goal-oriented,
competitive, contest-based, and a ludic physical activity. Although discrepancies exist
between these definitions and other definitions, sport is typically distinguished by
structure and the orientations of its participants. The following introduces the concept of
sport using McPherson’s (et al.) template and is supplemented with the thoughts of
additional theorists.
Firstly, sport is structured: sport has written and implied rules that control how
sport is managed. All participants in sport are constrained by the rules of sport; these are
either self-imposed or forced upon them by an official (Leonard II 1980: 13). If these
rules are broken, the participant faces a penalty that ranges in severity depending on
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which rule was broken. Furthermore, the rules state that sport is usually confined to a
small area, such as a cricket pitch or basketball court. There are varying degrees of
organizational structure in sport, ranging from virtually none at a sandlot level, to a
formal level in the professional ranks. It is common at the highest level for sport to have
mission statements, unions, and divisions of labour (McPherson et al. 1989: 15).
Sport is goal-oriented: The goals of sport range from individual goals, to team
goals, to league goals. This is illustrated by coaches, fans, players and the media’s
interest in an athlete’s attributes of “ability, competence, effort, degree of difficulty,
mastery and performance” (McPherson et at. 1989: 15). The previous characteristics are
often summarized by statistics, which provide an easy and simplified account of a
player’s ability. In addition to the overall score, the goals of sport also serve as targets for
a team to aim. For example, many teams have a checklist of sub-goals they aim to
achieve in order to achieve a higher goal.
Leonard’s interpretation of the orientations of sport is more extensive than
McPherson’s. Leonard breaks them down into two categories: intrinsic and extrinsic
orientations. Intrinsically, he mentions the internal motivators in sport, such as pride and
self-satisfaction. Extrinsically, he discusses the tangible rewards associated with sport,
such as money. Relevant to this paper, he uses these two orientations to define the key
differences between professional and amateur sport. He states that amateur sport is
founded on intrinsic orientations, while professional sport is founded on the extrinsic
orientations (Leonard II 1980: 13).
Sport is competitive. Similar to the previously described category, there are often
many layers of competition within a sports match. Competition in sport can occur in three
ways: there is direct competition where two or more athletes compete against each other;
there is parallel competition, where athletes take turns competing against each other (i.e.
golf and bowling); and there is competition against a standard, such as archery, diving,
and gymnastics (McPherson et at. 1989: 16). The level of competitive intensity ranges
from little at a social level, to supreme at the professional level.
Sport is contest-based. Sport usually takes place in two forms: sports can be
contests, as illustrated by sports such as golf and track. Sport can also exist as games,
such as baseball, rugby, cricket. As implied by the previous category, sports contests
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involve the three aforementioned forms of competition. Weiss (1969) states sport contests
are “occupied with demonstrating their relative superiority in five areas – speed,
endurance, strength, accuracy and coordination” (p 100 in McPherson 1989: 16). Another
interesting aspect of sporting contests is that they are often representative of a much
larger group then the individual athletes and coaches competing. For example, during the
Olympics, athletes not only represent themselves but also their country, therefore giving
athletes the power to influence national pride (McPherson et al. 1989: 16-7).
Sport is ludic. The term ludic stems from the Latin word ludus, which means play
or game; therefore, the term “ludic activity” implies that sport is based on play and
games. Although not all sport is based on play (professional sport), not all sports are
games (i.e. swimming, running, archery), and not all contests are playful (i.e. war).
McPherson (et al. 1989) argues that sport (as defined as a playful contest) “shares at lest
two elements with all ludic activities: an uncertain outcome and sanctioned display”
(1989: 17). Goffman (1961) states that the combination of an uncertain outcome and
sanctioned display are the criteria that make sport fun: the uncertain outcome makes the
game interesting to the closing moments. Furthermore, the sanctioned display gives
athletes the ability to “exhibit attributes valued in the wider social world, such as
dexterity, strength, knowledge, intelligence, courage, and self-control” (Goffman 1961:
68 in McPherson et al. 1989: 17).
Further supplementing McPherson and Leonard, Lushen (1972) argues that sport
lies between work and play on the continuum of activity; this makes perfect sense, since
sport can feel like either to an athlete (Lushin 1972: 119 in Leonard II 1980: 14). Despite
the definitions used to define sport in the previous section, there remain those who feel
that sport is indefinable, such as Slusher (1967): “Sport, like religion, defies definition. In
a manner it goes beyond definitive terminology. Neither has substance which can be
identified. In a sense both sport and religion are beyond essence” (Slusher 1967: 141 in
Leonard II 1980: 14).
Regardless of one’s interpretation of sport, it can be stated that it is a complicated
phenomenon. Since sport incorporates elements of fun, competition, simple objectives,
war and national-pride, it is easy to see why it is so popular. However, because sport is so
encompassing, it is important that it positively influences society.
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Section II: Doping
Before discussing anti-doping policy, one obviously needs to define doping and
explain its history. As illustrated, anti-doping policy hinges on definitions of doping.
Definitions
Inadequate definitions of doping have been a serious problem for regulators. Gary
Wadler (2003) of WADA points out that doping definitions are plentiful and continually
shifting; therefore, it is logical that regulators are having trouble controlling doping when
they are not in agreement in what constitutes doping (Wadler 2003: 4). Currently, the
most respected definition of doping is the IOC’s; however, even the IOC’s definition is
open to criticism, since it is relatively young and has been modified during its existence.
The history of the definitions of doping encompasses multiple shifts in anti-
doping strategy. The Council of Europe established the first definition of doping in 1963.
It defined doping as:
The administration of, or use by, a competing athlete of any substance foreign to
the body, or any physiologic substance taken in abnormal quantity, or taken by
an abnormal route of entry into the body with the sole intention of increasing in
an artificial and unfair manner his/her performance in competition. When
necessity demands medical treatment with any substance which, because of its
nature, dosage, or application is able to boost the athlete’s performance in
competition in an artificial manner, this too is regarded as doping (Wadler 2003:
4).
The aspect that makes this definition unique is that it accounts for the suspected doper’s
intentions; that is, by this definition, if an athlete mistakenly takes a performance
enhancer, they are not doping. This definition has its advantages: if an athlete mistakenly
ingests a PES, he or she is not penalized. On the other hand, it is problematic since
athletes can avoid suspension by claiming that they did not know they were using a PES.
Due to the problems created by the use of the word “intention”, the Olympic
Movement Anti-Doping Code modified its definition of doping in February 2003:
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The use of an artifice, whether substance or method, potentially dangerous to an
athlete’s health and/or capable of enhancing their performances, or the presence
in that athletes’ body of a substance, or the ascertainment of the use of a method
on the list annexed to the Olympic anti-doping code (Wadler 2003: 4).
Although it was created to remedy the shortcoming of the former definition, the 2003
definition also has its inadequacies. Because the word “intention” was removed, an
athlete can be suspended for unintentionally taking a banned substance; this was arguably
the case of Alain Baxter, who used an over-the-counter cold remedy (to treat the flu) at
the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake (2002) and was banned for doping (Miah 2004: 96).
However, because of the pressures to improve performance, many regulators feel (and
perhaps rightly so) that if intention is included in the definition of doping, that it provides
too great a loophole for those who wish to exploit it. It is also worth noting that the
phrasing “use in competition” if often used anti-doping policy and has been described as
problematic by lawyers (BMA 2002: 90).
The History of Doping
Doping has been around as long as sport itself. Depending on the source, the
earliest traces of doping can be traced back to between 800-300 BC (Carroll 2005: 30;
BMA 2002: 5). The ancient Greeks hosted gladiatorial festivals that generated enormous
pride for the regions.  These gladiators experimented with substances such as ginseng
root, hemp, kava, opium, hallucinogenic mushrooms, and animal testes in order to
increase performance (ibid: 5). According to Carroll (2005), the Greeks union between
sport and politics foreshadowed the substance-enhanced win-at-all-costs ideology
promoted by many twentieth-century governments.
Perhaps the first dope dealer and supplier is the Roman physician Flanius. He was
a noble with a medical education and had connections with the military, which supplied
him the knowledge of what other cultures used to enhance performance. Between his
medical knowledge and information supplied by the military, Flanius experimented with
unusual substances (such as coca leaves, hemlock, thistle, and lotus) on the gladiators he
treated. Predictably, Flanius’s gladiators were extremely popular with fans of the
Coliseum (Carroll 2005: 31-2).
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The next major advancement of PESs occurred in the 19th century when athletes
learned how to harness the performance-enhancing effects of substances like caffeine,
alcohol, ether, oxygen, cocaine, heroin, morphine, and strychnine. During the latter part
of the 19th century, there were a number of endurance cycling races were athletes would
administer one or numerous of the aforementioned substances and then race for 144
continuous hours (Voy 1991: 7). The Welsh cyclist Andrew Linton is credited as the first
person to die from taking PESs; he died in the Paris-to-Bordeaux bicycle race after taking
trimethyl in 1896 (Carroll 2005: 32).
Testosterone was introduced in 1921 by the University of Chicago chemist Fred
Koch. By adding chemicals to grounded bulls’ testicles, Koch was able to isolate the
male hormone. Koch verified his findings by injecting neutered chickens with
testosterone, the result being the capons began to display definite male characteristics
such as the ability to crow and comb coloration (Carroll 2005: 33). Ten years later, Adolf
F. J. Butenandt discovered the exact chemical formula of testosterone, and using those
findings, Leopold Rozika was able to transform chemical cholesterol into synthetic
testosterone in 1935. Butenandt and Rozika were rewarded for their achievement by
receiving the 1939 Nobel Prize for chemistry (Carroll 2005: 33-4).
Ironically, it was Butenandt’s and Rozika’s Nobel Prize winning work that
spawned the modern-doping era. The Nazi’s were the pioneers in developing and
administering injectable steroids. Initially, steroids were used to help with the recovery of
starvation victims and help those who had a testosterone deficiency (Wadler 2003: 2).
Furthermore, it was thought that steroids could also help ‘cure’ homosexuality (Lenehan
2003: 6-7). However, it did not take long for scientists to realize that the characteristics of
steroids, such as aggression and stamina, had applications in the military and athletics.
There are rumours that even Hitler used steroids (Taylor in Lenehan 2003: 6). In addition
to steroids, amphetamines also became popular among both soldiers and athletes during
WWII.
After WWII, the doping problem worsened. The 1964 Olympics became known
as the “Steroid Olympics” (BMA 2002: 76). This was due the apparent steroid problem
and because the IOC was developing a banned substance list; therefore, it was a popular
topic among athletes. The IOC did implement their banned-substance list in 1968;
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however, it was a cosmetic policy since they had not developed a method for
distinguishing synthetic and naturally occurring testosterone (BMA 2002: 76). Even
though the IOC eventually improved their testing procedures and expanded their banned-
substance list, dopers seemingly stay one step ahead by making improvements in the
concealment and potency of PESs.
Doping in American Athletes
The doping of American athletes started with the weight-lifting team trying to
remain competitive with the Soviets; the United States won 4 of the 6 gold medals in
1948 and 5 of the 7 in 1952. However, in 1956, the Soviets won the three medals (tied for
one of them). This is remarkable since the Soviets had not competed in the previous three
Olympic games (Carroll 2005: 36).
The team physician of the US weight-lifting team began to suspect that the
Russians were using something that the American team was not. His suspicions were
confirmed when he witnessed the Russians with a substance believed to be injectable
testosterone, and when one of the Soviet coaches admitted it after one too many drinks
(Carroll 2005: 36-7). Although this revelation certainly exposed the secret of the Russian
athletes, it did not threaten their achievement since there was no banned substance list at
the time.
Upon his return to America, Dr. Zeigler worked with the Ciba Pharmaceutical
Company to develop an oral anabolic steroid; it resulted in methandrostenolone, which
appeared on the market in 1960. The product was allowed to exist because it had a
legitimate medical use: the treatment of hypogonadism (the under-production of male
hormones).
When it came to testing the oral steroid, Zeigler experimented by dispensing the
daily-recommended dose of methandrostenolone to weightlifters; however, it was soon
discovered that his athletes had found another source for the drug and were abusing it.
The athletes soon started experience both the positive and negative effects of steroids
Zeigler stopped his experiments once he discovered the abuse of the new steroid;
however, he is often regarded as the Father of Anabolic Steroids in the United States.
When questioned about his goal of level the playing field with the Russians, Zeigler
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responded, “I wish I’d never heard the word ‘steroid’…these kids do not realize the price
they’ll pay” (Carroll 2005: 37).
The Prevalence of Doping
The official prevalence rates among US athletes range depending on the sport.
When MLB did an investigation in 2003, they found that between 5-7% players were
doping (Bodley 2005). On the other hand, of the 6,890 drug tests conducted by the U.S.
Anti-Doping Association in 2003, only 22 (0.3 percent) were positive (McCloskey &
Bailes 2005: 38). However, Penn State professor Dr. Charles Yesalis is quick to point
out, “These results do not measure the use of performance-enhancing strategies for which
no tests are currently available … including … substances like human growth hormone,
insulin, insulin-like growth factor, sodium bicarbonate and creatine, as well as techniques
of blood doping” (ibid: 38).
Supporting this claim is testimony of Dr. Robert Karr. Karr is a California sports
physician who said there was a time where at least 70 physicians in the Los Angeles area
were prescribing steroids to athletes. He said that he personally prescribed steroids to
approximately 20 medallists at the 1984 Olympics. What is even more significant is that
none of the athletes Dr. Karr help dope tested positive for using steroids, which leads one
to believe that the prevalence rates of doping is much higher than the sub-10% mark
(McCloskey & Bailes 2005: 38).
According to other accounts, the use of anabolic steroids has increased steadily
since WWII. It is estimated that by 1968, one third of the United States track and field
team had used steroids at the pre-Olympic training camp (BMA 2002: 76). A few years
later in the mid-1970s, many athletes considered steroids a necessary assistant. Backing
these claims is the former US woman’s track and field coach, Pat Connolly. Coach
Connolly estimates that 15 of the 50 members of the US track team used steroids at the
1984 Los Angeles Olympics (BMA 2002: 76). Connolly also said that doping became
more prevalent at the 1988 Seoul Olympics, where an estimated 40% of the woman’s
track team had used steroids in their preparation for the games (BMA 2002: 76). Around
the same time, the Australian government launched a similar inquiry. It was reported that
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70% of Australian athletes who competed internationally had taken illicit drugs (BMA
2002: 76).
In 1995, a survey of 448 British athletes stated that 48% felt that drug use was a
problem in international competition the figure was 86% among track & field athletes).
This statistic is cemented by another study that discovered that 29% of members of
“hardcore” gym members used steroids5 (BMA 2002: 77).
Perhaps the most serious concern when discussing the prevalence of doping, are
the statistics surrounding high school athletes. McCloskey & Bailes (2005) state: “Almost
every modern survey conducted on steroid use arrives at the same conclusion: anywhere
from 3.5 percent of teenagers (athletes and non athletes) to 12 percent (athletes only) are
using these drugs (2005: 14). Furthermore, Dr. Charles Yesalis (Penn State Professor and
world-renowned steroids experts) stated in 2004 that nearly one million high school
athletes used steroids (he cited the Youth Risk Behaviour Surveillance System (YRBSS)
conducted by the National Institute on Drug Abuse) (Yesalis in McCloskey & Bailes
2005: 7-8). Adding to concern is these statistics account for only steroids and not other
types of performance enhancement.
Doping at the high school level is more dangerous than at other levels for a couple
of reasons: firstly, professionals have trainers, physicians, and dietitians to help them
monitor their use; adolescents do not have these resources. This forces high school dopers
to use under dubious circumstances. Secondly, using PESs is far more dangerous at
puberty because the body is not fully developed; thus magnifying the negative effects of
doping.
Perpetuates of Doping
Since doping is becoming gradually more visible, many hypotheses of why
doping is becoming more prevalent are being suggested. These reasons include factors
such as: the commercialisation of sport, the politicisation of sport, the increased
competitiveness of sport, and the medicalisation of sport. The following explains each in
further detail:
                                                 
5 A “hardcore” gym is defined as having predominately heavy weight-training equipment,
competitive body builders, and relatively few female members.
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The Commercialisation of Sport
The two main perpetuates of the commercialisation of sport are the development
of sports sponsorship, and the increasing global audience of sport through television.
Corporate sponsorship of athletes and sports advertising hardly existed before the 1970s.
However, now athletes are commonly paid multi-million dollars to endorse products.
The result of the increase in endorsements is a huge flux in the amount of money
involved in sport. In addition to large salaries, athletes are now receiving income from
corporate sponsorship, television commercials and product endorsements. A problem
with this model is that the distribution of these rewards are skewed; that is, most of the
rewards go to the ultra-elite athletes. This model encourages doping.
The Politicalisation of Sport
Although sport has always had some influence over the politics, it really became
obvious during WWII and the Cold War. During this time, sport was added to the
established competitive arenas of international politics, military and economics.
Unsurprisingly, due to strong rivalries, countries began to look to new technologies to
increase the performance of their athletes. The success of these athletes (doped or
undoped) was used to fuel propaganda. This was the case when Hitler aimed to promote
his superior race propaganda with the 1936 Olympics in Berlin; however, the African-
American Jesse Owens won four Gold medals to counter Hitler’s claim (Hart-Davis
1986: 247-9). Presently, the competition between countries has steadily hardened to the
point were medal-count-per-country is one of the primary focuses of the Olympics rather
than the more classic objective of diplomacy.
The Increased Competitiveness of Sport
Due to factors such as the increased monetary incentives, commercialisation,
media influence, and the politicalisation of sport, sport is becoming increasingly
competitive. Traditionally, participation was seen as the primary objective of sport, as
modelled by the classic “English public school elite” (Dunning in BMA 2002: 81). These
English schools were opposed to competing for cups and medals because they felt it
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placed an overemphasis on victory and eroded the virtues of sport. Furthermore, these
schools believed that sport should be played for the intrinsic pleasure that sport provided,
not the extrinsic pleasure of cups and medals (ibid: 81).
On the other end of the philosophical spectrum is contemporary sport. Athletes
are now encouraged to not only compete, but win, and in some cases win by as much as
they can (due to the “differential” ranking system). The following quotation is made by
Roger Miller (Tour de France cyclist) who describes the amount of discomfort athletes
endure to win:
The riders reckon that a good Tour takes one year off your life, and when you finish in a
bad state, they reckon three years….
You can’t describe to a normal person how tired you feel . . . In 1987, when I
finished in a really bad way it took me until the end of November to recover; by that I
mean I could not wake up and not feel tired as if I had already done a day’s work.
The fatigue starts to kick in on the Tour after 10 days if you’re in good shape, and
after five days if you’re not in your best condition physically. Then it all just gets worse
and worse, you don’t sleep so much, so you don’t recover as well from the day’s racing,
so you go into your reserves, you get more knackered, so you sleep less . . . It’s simply a
vicious circle.
The best way of describing how you feel is that it’s as if you were a normal person
doing a hard day’s work, you’ve got the flu, and you can just about drive home and fall
into bed. By the end of the Tour, you need sleeping tablets.
You can’t divide the mental and the physical suffering; you tend to let go mentally
before you crack physically. . .
Riding up one of the mountains in the Tour if you’re feeling bad is like being sick.
Physically, your body has a limit every day, there’s only a set speed you can go at and it
might not always be good enough.
The pain in your legs is not the kind of pain you get when you cut yourself, it’s
fatigue, and it’s self-imposed. . .
It takes two weeks to recover from a good Tour, three months to recover from a bad
one.
(Robert Miller in Waddington 2000: 161)
A final source that describes the level of competitiveness among elite athletes is a
survey of over 100 top American athletes that took place in the late 1970s. The survey
revealed “nearly 55% of them reported they would be willing to take a drug which would
kill them within a year if it could assure them of an Olympic gold medal. A follow-up to
this study in 1984 of 198 world-class athletes found that 52% of them would take a
wonder drug that would probably kill them within five years, if it guaranteed success”
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(BMA 2002: 11). As illustrated, elite sport is insanely competitive, therefore, it is not
surprising that athletes use PESs to gain an advantage.
The Medicalisation of Sport
Since WWII, sport has become medicalised in two ways: firstly, there have been
vast improvements in pharmacology, which has led to more potent drugs with less side-
effects. Secondly, there has been an increase of sports trainers, physicians and medical
specialists working with athletes. Finally, society has become increasingly medicalised,
therefore it is a small wonder that athletes have as well.6
Also fostering doping is the creation of sports medicine, which exists on the
premise the athletes need special attention to compete at the elite level. The objective of
sports medicine extends well beyond the treatment of injuries to maximizing
performance. Brown and Brenner (2002) point out that an “increased importance has
been placed on winning and in order to do so, athletes have turned to ‘mechanical
(exercise, massage), nutritional (vitamins, minerals), psychological (discipline,
transcendental meditation), and pharmacological (medicines, drugs) methods’.
[Furthermore], a major emphasis has been placed on the non-medical use of drugs,
particularly anabolic steroids, central nervous system stimulants, depressants and
analgesics” (Brown & Brenner in BMA 2002: 79). In order to illustrate how many
substances professional athletes ingest, the following is Barry Bonds Daily Intake of
Nutritional Supplements:
                                                 
6 “Medicalisation of society / sport” is defined as the permeation of medical practices in
these respective fields.
35
Table 1: Barry Bonds Daily Intake of Nutritional Supplements in 2003
______________________________________________________________________________
Morning:
50 g special whey protein blend
25 g complex carbohydrates
5 g glutamine peptides
5 g New Zealand colostrums
Pre-workout:
1,000 mg phenylalanine
1000 mg tyrosine
10 mg Vitamin [B.sub.6]
200 mcg chromium (as
polynicotinate)
2 mg copper (as sebacate)
Post-Workout:
50 g whey protein isolates
50 g dextrose
5 g glutamine peptides
2 g arginine
200 mcg chromium (as
polynicotinate)
1.5 g magnesium creatine
1.5 g creatine monohydrate
5 g New Zealand colostrums
Afternoon:
10 mg iron (glycinate)
200 mcg selenium (as selenomethionine)
10,000 IU Vitamin A
500 mg Vitamin C
800 IU Vitamin E
400 IU Vitamin D
25 mg Vitamin [B.sub.1]
25 mg Vitamin [B.sub.2]
25 mg Vitamin [B.sub.6]
500 mcg Vitamin [B.sub.12]
400 mcg folic acid
500 mg omega-3 fatty acids
250 mg d-glucosamine sulfate
350 mg n-acetyl d-glucosamine
200 mg omega-6 fatty acids
150 mg chondroitin sulfate
Evening:
50 g special whey protein blend
25 g complex carbohydrates
5 g glutamine peptides
5 g New Zealand colostrums
Before Bedtime:
3 capsules ZMA, which contain 30 mg zinc
(as monomethionine/aspartate)
450 mg magnesium (as aspartate)
10.5 mg of Vitamin [B.sub.6]
200 mg L-theonine
50 mg 5-HTP
_______________________________________________________________________
(McCloskey & Bailes 2005: 71-72).
Finally reinforcing the medicalisation of sport is the widespread use of
recreational drugs in sport. Recreational drugs have a long history in sport: Alcohol has a
long-standing tradition in many sports; Chewing tobacco has a history of use in baseball.
There are also cases of professional athletes using illicit recreational drugs, such as Ricky
Williams (NFL) who was suspended from football for using marijuana (Carroll 2005:
114). The slippery-slope argument applies here: if athletes are using legal recreational
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drugs and legal vitamins, one can see how they might not struggle ethically to take PESs,
especially if they think it will increase performance.
Conclusion: Doping
In summary, the previous section explained the history, prevalence, and
perpetuates of doping, so that the reader has an understanding of mechanisms that
regulators are facing. The following section continues by explaining how regulators have
historically handled doping.
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Section III: Doping Regulation
History
After WWII, upon hearing rumours of athletes using substances to enhance
performance, the IOC created a banned-substance list. Anti-doping polices and testing
formally began in 1968 in response of the 1964 Olympics that were submerged with
PESs, especially steroids. However, at that point the IOC was limited to testing for
mainly amphetamines since scientists where unable to distinguish between synthetic (or
doped) testosterone and naturally occurring testosterone (Carroll 2005: 39).
As PESs started to infiltrate into other sporting arenas, additional anti-doping
policies were created. In 1983, the National Basketball Association (NBA) began testing
for PESs. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) followed by beginning
testing 1986, although it only targeted specific sports. The National Football League
(NFL) began its testing in 1987. Finally and most interestingly, Major League Baseball
(MLB) did not begin testing until 2003 (35 years after the IOC began testing) (Bodley
2005). At the international level, a separate body was created to control PESs called the
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). WADA was created in 1999 and had a starting
budget of US $15 million in 2002 (Haugen 2004: 67). Most international sports bodies
have adopted WADA’s anti-doping policy with the most notable exceptions being the
major professional sports associations in the United States.
Currently anti-doping testing is getting more complicated. Regulators are
struggling to keep up with new PESs and prosecute the dopers who use them. Also
complicating the matter is athletic associations are not united about what constitutes a
PESs; therefore, confusing all the actors of sport. Although an increasing number of
international sports bodies are adhering to WADA’s standard, there are still many visible
and high profile professional sports associations that remain independent with
significantly more relaxed interpretations of doping, such as the NBA, the NFL, and
MLB.
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Anti-Doping Policy: An Emerging Public Issue
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when doping became a public issue; therefore,
this section identifies four occurrences that contributed to it appearance: the Ben Johnson
scandal of the 1988 Olympics; the premature deaths of famous American athletes; the
unusual statistics in baseball; the potency and covertness of new PESs. These factors
eventually contributed to the federal government intervening by issuing federal
subpoenas to the major American sports associations in 2005 (Committee on Energy and
Commerce – US House of Representatives 2005).
Although Olympic athletes had previously been disqualified for doping, the
stripping of Ben Johnson’s Gold medal in the 100m sprint at the 1988 Olympic games
really brought the issue of doping to the forefront7. Due to the rivalry between Johnson
(Canada) and Carl Lewis (USA), there was much media attention placed on the match-
up. Johnson went on to win the competition with a world record time of 9.79 seconds.
After the race, Lewis stated that numerous established sprinters had a sudden
improvement in performance: Lewis blamed it on doping. As it turned out, Johnson was
disqualified a few days later for using the banned steroid stanozolol (Toohey & Veal
2000: 144; McCloskey & Bailes 2005: 11-2)8.
A second factor that pushed doping into the media spotlight is the premature
deaths of professional athletes. The most famous case was the 1992 death of NFL
defensive lineman Lyle Alzado. Although doctors never proved a link between his brain
cancer and steroids, Alzado was certain that there was a connection between his steroid
use and his brain cancer; Alzado died at the age of 439.
Another causality of doping that propelled the awareness of doping is the case of
Tyler Hooton. Hooton was a high school pitcher who took steroids to increase
performance; however, he suffered from steroid-related depression and eventually
                                                 
7 Johnson was the 39th athlete disqualified from the Olympics Games (Toohey & Veal
2000: 144).
8 Interestingly, the doses of anabolic steroids taken by Johnson were lower than what the
World Health Organization found safe to administer as a male contraception (Cashmore
2000: 210).
9 Also propelling the public awareness of PESs were the premature deaths of professional
athletes, Ken Caminiti (MLB) and Steve Bechler (MLB) (Carroll 2005: 7).
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committed suicide. Hooton’s father has been outspoken about the risks of steroids and
wants to make it clear that the use of PESs are not exclusive to professional or elite
athletes (Longman 2003; Carroll 2005: 7; US Senate [108-814 2004]: 41-5).
Another factor that created public attention was the strategic changes in
professional sport. Although it is not as visible in other sports, baseball experienced a
definite change in strategy around the late 1990s. The strategies changed from ‘small-
ball’, which is characterized by such plays as bunting and stealing baseballs, to ‘power-
ball’, which emphasizes hitting homeruns. During this period in time, three major
leaguers surpassed Roger Maris’s homerun record of 61 that had lasted for nearly forty
years. Although some critics argue that factors such as juiced balls and shorter fences
also contributed to a boost in homeruns, there was a noticeable physical difference in the
physiques of many players (Carroll 2005: 222-7). A common example is the physique of
Barry Bonds, who morphed from a lean placement-hitter early in his career, to a colossus
power-hitter.
A final occurrence that popularised the interest of doping is the potency and
covertness of contemporary PESs. When the story broke on THG, many people were
intrigued at how a disgruntled individual had to bring doping monitors a sample and tell
them it was a steroid before regulators could identify it. An undetectable, ingestible
steroid was certainly revolutionary and captivating in the minds of the public.
Furthermore, the substance was linked to many elite athletes such as Marion Jones (US
Sprinter) and Barry Bonds (MLB) (Dohrmann 2006: 66).
Anti-Doping Policy Versus Public Policy
In order to legitimise anti-doping policy as worthy of the attention of political
science, an explanation of how anti-doping policy fits under the umbrella of public policy
is needed. This exercise is important because it dictates whether doping should be
regulated publicly or privately. In order to do this, a collection of existing justifications
for public policy is used to theorize why anti-doping policy is a legitimate public policy
field. This question can be broken down further by addressing the two internal elements
of anti-doping policy: sports regulation and drug regulation. This section addresses these
questions and places anti-doping policy in the wider field of public policy.
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Common Justifications of Regulatory Fields
In western-styled democracies, governments usually allow privately owned
industries to function with little regulation; however, there are certain circumstances
where governments intervene. Lane (in Mitchell) concludes that the following entities are
most likely to be influenced by governmental controls:
 i. The industry is a natural monopoly (transportation, utilities).
 ii. The industry deals with matters critical to the defence of a nation (atomic energy,
shipping, aircraft production).
 iii. The industry receives a substantial share of its patronage from the government
(road building, munitions).
 iv. The industry is particularly subject to foreign competition (copper, wool, meat,
shipping).
 v. The industry depends upon natural resources under governmental control
(lumber, hydro-electric and all extractive industries).
 vi. The industry is ‘sick,’ i.e., cannot achieve conditions of competition in which a
substantial portion of the industry operates profitably (dry cleaning, coal mining).
 vii. The industry is composed of some large efficient firms considered threatening by
many small independent firms (drug and grocery stores).
(Lane in Mitchell & Mitchell 1969: 218-219).
After reading through this list, the argument can be made that sport fits into most of these
categories. Firstly, in America, it can be argued that elite sport is a monopoly, since
sporting revenues are collected primarily by the big five sports associations (NFL, NBA,
MLB, MLS and NHL). Although historically there were multiple leagues within some
sports, over the past few decades, the weaker associations either joined the more
dominant organizations or were forced out of business. This is illustrated by: the
American Basketball Association (ABA) joining the NBA; by the American Football
League (AFL) joining the NFL; and, by the Extreme Football League (XFL) shutting
down.
In reference to Lane’s second criteria, if one takes a liberal interpretation of
“national defence” to include national health, sport would fit the category. As previously
mentioned, the health risks of doping are three-fold: the health risks to a user who is
trying to gain an advantage; the health risks to a user that is trying to remain competitive;
and the health risk to those who use drugs to emulate their sports hero(es). What is
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interesting about Lane’s list is that it does not include a separate category for health;
although, national defence could be interpreted as defending against all threats including
medical threats.
Although anti-doping policy does not fit in Lane’s criteria numbers iii-vi, a case
could be made for number vii. Professional athletics are the most visual branch of sport in
America and do pose a risk to amateur sports. This risk includes both a health risk and a
ethical risk. Therefore, it could be argued that the government should regulate doping in
both professional and amateur sport.
Sports Regulation and Health Regulation
In order to get an idea of how involved government should be in regulating
doping, it is interesting to break anti-doping policy into two parts (drugs and sport) and
see how government has traditionally regulated those two items.
Firstly, the US government has a long history of regulating drugs. There are now
two key institutions that are in place to control the drugs. One is the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), which is designed to test new drugs for safety and affectability
before they are released to the general public. The other is the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA), which was created to control the manufacturing, distribution and consumption of
illegal drugs (typically recreational drugs). These institutions were created in 1906 and
1973 respectively. The FDA in particular has been the filter and main obstacle that all
new drugs have to navigate before they can become legal (www.fda.gov 2007;
www.dea.gov 2007).
Switching to sport regulation, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) was created in 1906 to combat injuries in football. The “Flying Wedge” was the
most popular offence at the time, which was characterized by one solid mass of players
on offence and gang-tackling on defence; this often led to serious injury and death.
President Theodore Roosevelt summoned the leaders of the major university and told
them to make football safer or it would be banned: the result was the creation of the
NCAA (www.NCAA.org). The NCAA is now responsible for regulating all the
components of formal inter-collegiate athletics.
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Finally, there is the institution that is designed to regulate both drugs and sport:
the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA). The USADA was created in 2000 to
satisfy four objectives: research, education, testing, and results management. Although
the education and research aspects of their mission statement apply to sport in general,
the testing and results management are geared toward the Olympic program.
Furthermore, the USADA have had little to do with the professional sports associations
even thought they have “full authority to execute a comprehensive national anti-doping
program encompassing testing, adjudication, education, and research, and to develop
programs, policies, and procedures in each of those areas” (www.usantidoping.org).
Perhaps with time the USADA will have more power over professional sports teams but
presently their power is limited. Currently, there is no authority currently monitoring
doping across all professional American sports.
Ethics of Doping: The Justifications for Regulating PESs
The most interesting aspect of anti-doping policy is the ethical considerations.
These considerations are important because they shape the construction of anti-doping
policies. In these justifications, “harm” is a principle factor. Harm can be broadly
interpreted, because it can range from physical harm (such as the health risk of using
PESs) to abstract concepts of harm (such as undermining the nature of sport). The
following section is organized using a compilation of Miah’s and Cashmore’s theoretical
justifications for regulating drugs in sport (Miah, 2000: 18-19; Cashmore, 2000: 217).
Harm is featured under the following headings:
i. PESs are Contrary to the Nature of Sport
ii. PESs Undermine the Nature of Sport
iii. PESs are Contrary to, and Do Not Promote, the Internal Goods of Sport
iv. PESs Harm the Extended Members of the Sporting Community
v. PESs are Unnatural
vi. PESs are Unfair
vii. PESs Create An Unearned Advantage
viii. PESs are Coercive
ix. PESs are Harmful to Economics
x. PESs are a Health Risk to Society
xi. PESs are a Form of Rule-Breaking, Cheating, and Disrespect
xii. PESs are a Violation of Contract
xiii. PESs Make Athletes Poor Role Models
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The following explains these arguments and elaborates on their strengths and
weaknesses. The second half of this section approaches the arguments from the opposite
perspective.
PESs are Contrary to the Nature of Sport
Simon (1991) and Tamburrini (2000) argue, “Sport has an internal essence that is
compromised by the use of drugs. As such, their use is unethical” (in Miah 2004: 18). In
other words, sport has a spirit that is harmed by PESs. Due to the abstract nature of this
argument, it is not as strong as some of the more material arguments against doping.
PESs Undermine the Nature of Sport
Although no harm can literally occur to sport because it is intangible, harm as
undermining the nature of sport is understood as gaining an advantage over sport itself.
Therefore, if an athlete has an advantage over sport, they undermine sport’s value. In
other words, PESs are unethical because they make sports too easy. Schneider and
Butcher (2000) agree: “[PESs are] unfair because they undermine the challenge of
competition by providing levels of performance that are not attributable to the athlete”
(Miah 2004: 26). This argument is a subtle variation on the previous argument: instead of
PESs attacking sport directly (as above), dopers are said to be eroding its foundation. It
may be possible to collapse the first and second argument into one; however, this paper
defers to Miah (2004), who makes separate distinctions.
PESs are Contrary to, and Do Not Promote, the Internal Goods of Sport
Schneider and Butcher (1994) state that “sports are valued because of their
unique, internal goods. The use of drugs does not contribute to, and is contrary to, such
goods. As such, it is unethical” (in Miah 2004: 18). The internal goods being referred to
in this justification are broad: they can range from physical to ethical goods. Although
this justification sounds similar to the previous justifications, it is subtly different because
it refers to the goods associated with sport, not sport itself.
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PESs Harm the Extended Members of the Sporting Community
Miah (2004) justifies the regulation of PESs by citing the harm that occurs to the
sporting community, that is: sports fans, spectators, and enthusiasts (2004: 28-30). This
type of harm occurs in two ways: firstly, the sporting community is harmed when
community members experience a PES-related health problem that results when they
emulate their doped sports hero. Secondly, harm results from the disappointment of
spectators when an athlete is linked to doping.
PESs are Unnatural
Hoberman et al. (1992) state that “drugs are unnatural, and for this reason, they
are unethical because sporting performances are valued as natural performances” (in
Miah 2004:18). In other words, sports are valued because they are perceived as a natural
practise; therefore, doping is unethical because it erodes sport’s naturalness. Although the
point is understood, there are two faults with this justification. Firstly, the performance of
an athlete depends on everything from food, sleep, and mental-state; therefore, it is
impossible to identify a natural level of performance or state of being. Furthermore, this
argument implies that sporting performance needs to be kept consistent; however,
improvements in nutrition, sports-science, and other advancements have already eroded
this possibility.
Secondly, the attempt to implement policy on the grounds of being unnatural is
problematic. There are many forms of performance enhancement that could be legal
depending where the line is drawn. For example, blood doping could be considered legal
because an athlete using his or her own oxygen-enriched blood. Also, even though PESs
are synthetic, denigrating them on the basis of being synthetic is unjustifiable, in that
medicine regularly uses synthetic variants of PESs to cure the unwell. Furthermore,
synthetic variants in medicine are often viewed as honourable, not sinister. One can see
how ethical ambiguity interferes with this justification.
PESs are Unfair
Gardner et al. (1989) argue that permitting drugs in sport is unfair for one or all of
the following: the participating athletes, members of the sporting community, or the sport
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itself (Miah 2004: 18). Although Gardner’s point is understood, unfairness is abstract and
difficult to place in policy. Furthermore, some athletes are born with certain physical or
mental traits that place them in an advantaged position. It could also be argued that
unfairness adds to the attractiveness of sport; spectators are inspired by how athletes are
able to overcome obstacles and achieve success despite their shortcomings. This is
illustrated by the admiration for Tyrone “Muggsy” Bogues (NBA) and Daniel “Rudy”
Ruettiger (NCAA-Football)10.
PESs Create an Unearned Advantage
Carr (1999) states, “because drugs make it possible to achieve better
performances without additional training, they are unethical: sporting achievements
should be earned by athletes” (in Miah 2004: 18). The unearned advantage argument
implies that the success of the athlete should be determined not by what an athlete wins,
but how he or she win it. Although the point is credible, there are many instances of
athletes achieving success without earning it. For example, Manute Bol was a 7’7”
basketball player who had little athletic ability; however, he was signed to an NBA
contract because of his height. Since height is not earned, it could be concluded that Bol
had an unearned advantage. Furthermore, U.S. Olympic track coach Brooks Johnson said
that elite athletes are freaks in regards to size, speed, and strength (Johnson in Sokolove
2004:32). Therefore, while champion athletes have to work to earn some of their goals,
much of their success is derived from their unearned natural advantages over competitors.
PESs are Coercive
Garner et al. (1989) suggest that if there were no regulation, athletes would have
to make a choice between taking PESs and staying competitive; or abstaining from PESs
and not being competitive (in Miah 2004:18). In other words, some athletes take PESs
                                                 
10 Muggsy Bogues, at 5’3” is the smallest player in NBA history. During his 15 season
career he averaged 7.7 points per game, 7.6 assist per game, and 1.54 steals per game.
(Muggsy Bogues - nba.com 2007). Daniel ‘Rudy’ Ruettiger wanted to play football at the
University of Notre Dame, despite not having many physical talents. He spent his entire
career on the practise squad; however, he was able to dress (and play) in the last game of
his senior year. His story has been made into a major motion picture
(rudyinternational.com 2007).
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not because they are trying to gain an advantage over the opposition, but because they
want to remain competitive. Although this is a good argument, there is also the counter-
argument that sports are a naturally coercive environment, as illustrated by athletes
having to workout to gain advantage or remain competitive.
The coercion justification is solid but it is based on certain assumptions. Firstly, it
assumes that if there was no regulation, that prevalence rates of PESs would escalate;
however, most existing PESs have serious risks that potentially jeopardize an athlete’s
ability to perform. For example, Hank Aaron Jr. says he witnessed steroid abuse first
hand when he played football in college: “[athletes using steroids] got crazy…their
bodies fell apart. Their knees – they can’t even walk now” (Smith 2005: 50)11. Another
anecdote is that of boxer Bob Hazelton who had both of his legs amputated because of
steroid abuse:
I sat back down to raise my tights up to see [why my leg was wet] and that’s
when I noticed my calf had split down the middle. A grey black liquid was
oozing from the opening. The leg had very little circulation and the tissue was
breaking down. I knew it was only a matter of time before I would lose my leg.
Two weeks later, my first [of many] amputation took place (Hazelton in Anabolic
Steroids Act of 2004: 19)
Therefore, the health risks involved with many PESs could provide enough of a deterrent
to be self-regulating; however, in the future, PESs will be safer, thus making self-
regulation unfeasible.
The second assumption of the coercion argument is no way in which athletes
could remain competitive without taking drugs. This statement is appropriate when
applied to individual sporting events, such as sprinting, because of the emphasis placed
on physical performance over strategy; however, in team sports, success hinges not so
much on the talents of an individual, but on the team’s ability to “gel”12. There are
countless examples of physically inferior athletes being successful because they work
well with others. For example, 2005 and 2006 NBA Most Valuable Player (MVP) Steve
Nash won the prestigious honour not because of his physical size (he is 6’3” & 195lbs),
                                                 
11 Hank Aaron Jr. is the son of the all-time MLB homerun leader – Hank Aaron.
12 To “gel” is to get all members of the team working well together, so that they are not
playing as individuals but as one single entity.
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but because of his mastery of basketball. In contrast to Nash, there are numerous
examples of athletes with enormous physical potential who never achieve success
because they do not have the ability to mould with the team.
PESs are Harmful to Economics
Cashmore (2000) states that since professional sport is a business, it needs to be
protected from anything that threatens its ability to generate income, such as PESs (2000:
214). In accordance with this justification is the thought that sports policy should reflect
the wishes of the sporting community; since fans financially support athletics, they
should decide on what is permissible. Traditionally, it was believed that spectators
wanted to see PES-free competitions; however, it seems that this opinion is changing. For
example, “During the 2004 baseball season, which was clouded with rumours of steroid
use by such top sluggers as Barry Bonds, Jason Giambi and Gary Sheffield, MLB set an
attendance record” (Weir 2004). This statistic suggests that the baseball community does
not care about PES abuse in baseball; apparently, they are more interested in homeruns.
The problem exists: do sports associations tailor their services to fans’
expectations or do they try to preserve the “dignity” of the game13? As previously
demonstrated, these objectives do not always coincide. Although there are some
individuals who are adamant that drugs should not be allowed in sport, a recent New York
Times poll indicates that 41% of people under the age of 30 do not care if professional
athletes use steroids (Smith 2005: 43). This statistic supports the idea that remaining
PES-free is not economically vital for professional sports, and perhaps it is beneficial to
allow athletes PESs, since athletes who dope are more capable of record-breaking
performances.
In summary, the business argument is important, because sport associations need
to listen to the consumer so that they can remain economically feasible; however, also
hinging on economic sustainability is dignity. This balance creates many questions:
Should sports be tailored to suit the fans? Should sports remain defiant in order to
preserve integrity? And, is drug-free sport the best policy? Seemingly, the sports fans are
                                                 
13 Dignity in this sense is remaining true to the original principles that the sport was
founded on, such as sports being a showcase for natural performances.
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divided about what role PESs should have in sport, thereby creating problems for
regulators.
PESs are a Health Risk to Society
The argument that PESs are a health risk is the most ubiquitous and strongest
argument used by anti-doping advocates. There are three parts to the health risk
justification: PESs are a health risk to the user; PESs are a health risk to an athlete who is
being coerced in taking them in order to remain competitive; and, the societal health risk
that results from amateur athletes emulating their doping sports heroes. These arguments
are highly objective and are strengthened by statistics and anecdotes. There exists the
counter-argument that some sports are more risky than PESs; for example, sports such as
boxing are associated with high rates of head trauma, as opposed to the low-health-risk
associated with many controlled PESs14. However, this argument can be avoided by using
the phrase “unnecessary risk”, because risk is built into boxing. and cannot be removed
without changing its nature.
PESs are a Form of Rule-Breaking, Cheating, and Disrespect
Arnold et al. (1997) state, “Drug taking is unacceptable because it is against the
rules. Breaking the rules is considered to be cheating and so the use of drugs is also
cheating. Cheating is also unacceptable because it demonstrates a lack of respect for the
other participants and the sport” (in Miah 2004: 18). The rule breaking argument is
effective because it is straightforward and objective: doping is against the rules, thus
impermissible.
Another aspect of this argument that has potential usefulness is respect. Most
members of the sporting community are familiar with the sports cliché of “respect for the
game”, which implies that good sportspersons are required to respect the honour code of
the game they play. Despite the flamboyant nature of some professionals, there remains a
chivalrous characteristic of sport; that is, many athletes desire the respect of their peers
                                                 
14 The head trauma associated with boxing is so prevalent that it has its own term: “punch
drunk”. Punch drunk is characterized by slurred speech, slow reactions and occasional
blackouts; it results from extended brain damage due to punches to the head (BBC News
1999).
49
(as is similar to most professions). However, in an ironic twist, sport favours those
competitors who push the balance of cheating / disrespect. For example, when going for a
loose ball, soccer advantages the athlete who pushes their opponent out of the way
enough to get possession the ball, but not enough to be called for a foul. Perhaps athletes
who use PESs view doping in the same way: they are pushing the line but not crossing it.
This thought is justifiable, because the lack of harmonized policy has created confusion
concerning the legality of PESs.
PESs are a Violation of Contract
Butcher and Schneider et al. (1998) state, “Entering sporting competition entails
making a tacit contract with one’s opponent to play under the same conditions. Failure to
do this by using means of performance modification that are outside of the agreed means
is unethical because it breaks this contract with other participants” (in Miah 2004: 19).
Although this is a subtle twist on the cheating argument, it is effective because it is
phrased in terms of contract law (as opposed to the abstract concepts of honour and
virtue). Due to its objectivity, this argument is effective when placed in policy.
PESs Makes Athletes Poor Role Models
Cashmore (2000) asserts that athletes are role models and their actions will be
emulated by young sportspersons; thus, professional athletes have an obligation to society
to practise ethical and healthy lifestyles (2000: 212). This argument hinges on the amount
of influence that professional athletes have over aspiring sportspersons. If athletes
possess the ability to influence the PES-behaviours of children, the case for firm anti-
doping policies is strengthened. On the other hand, it could be argued that many young
people aspire to be like their parents and coaches rather than their sports idols.
Furthermore, blaming professional athletes for the drug use of young athletes is unfair in
relation to other influential societal figures: for example, many musicians openly use
drugs and some even believe that drug use is beneficial to their practise, yet they are not
vilified like doped athletes.
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The Justifications for Regulation
In summary, there are numerous justifications for prohibiting PESs. They share
two things in common: the desire for sports’ regulators to level the playing field and the
need for regulation to occur as result of a particular harm. Although these arguments are
most visible, it appears that they are many logical reasons to allow doping. The following
explains these possibilities.
The Justifications for Not Regulating PESs
The attention given to the justifications for not regulating PESs is relatively
limited; however, it appears that there are many logical reasons for no or moderate
regulation, as illustrated by the following headings:
i. PESs are a Health Risk to Society: Revisited
ii. PESs Do Not Promote the Internal Goods of Sport: Revisited
iii. Testing is Too Expensive
iv. Testing is Psychologically Oppressive
v. Technology is More Threatening to Sport Than PESs
vi. Strength Versus Hand-Eye Coordination
vii. The Regulation of PESs Creates Double Standards
a. Athletes Versus Artists
b. PESs Versus a Performance Enhanced Society
viii. Athletes are Genetic Freaks
ix. Regulating PESs Makes the Playing Field Uneven
x. Doping is Good for Sport
xi. Nobody Cares if Athletes Dope
xii. Regulation is Futile
The following section elaborates on these reasons, thus balancing the arguments given
previously.
PESs are a Health Risk to Society: Revisited
As discussed above, one of the foremost arguments for banning PESs is that they
are harmful to a person’s health. However, the health argument is usually proposed in
terms of the number of people affected, not by the degree of risk. As previously
explained, when comparing the health risk of the average banned substance to the head
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trauma experienced by boxers, one could conclude that boxing should be banned ahead of
PESs.
Another aspect that twists the health risk argument is that many banned PESs are
used therapeutically in medicine (Sokolove 2004: 32). For example, the PES of choice
for endurance cyclists, EPO, is also an effective treatment for patients with anaemia.
Furthermore steroids, which are currently being scrutinized by MLB, have been used by
medicine for treating muscle degenerative diseases, such as AIDS (ibid 32-33).
Seemingly, the bad publicity that PESs receive is unwarranted, since the same substances
are ethically agreeable in other contexts. This raises the question: how does the morality
of a substance change depending on context?
PESs Harm the Internal Goods of Sport: Revisited
Reverting back to the section titled “PESs harm the internal goods of sport”, it is
argued that PESs change the way sports are played. However, this argument is countered
by stating that sports have changed regardless of PESs. Sport, like other professions,
rewards those who improvise: for example, during the early days of the NBA, George
Mikan revolutionized basketball with the popularisation of the slam-dunk. Continuing
with the example of basketball, the jump shot, the alley-oop, and the no-look pass have
all contributed to the progression of basketball and shaped it into its current form.
Furthermore, it has been argued that sport’s record books will become tainted if
doping is not eliminated. However, if records were truly comparable, sport would no
longer be able to evolve, which is impossible regardless of PESs due to improvements in
health, equipment and knowledge. In other words, record books are already askew before
factoring in PESs. Perhaps this logic justifies the use of PESs: they could be viewed as
the next revolution of sports.
Testing is Too Expensive
The argument that dope testing is too expensive is best suited to amateur sports
that have tighter budgets than professional sport. At the high school level, the most basic
anti-doping tests costs about US $95, whereas dope tests appropriate for collegiate and
professional level range between US $200-300 (Black in Carroll 2005: 104; Weir 2005:
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3). However, the previous tests do not test for all known PESs, they test for the most
prevalent, thus providing loop-holes for experienced dopers.
Another significant cost is the laboratories where samples are tested: at the Soul
Olympics, Hewlett-Packard charged the IOC US$3 million to set up testing facilities in
South Korea (Cashmore 2000: 203). Overall, with the progression of PESs, it is suspected
that the costs of tests will steadily increase. Although testing can be a budget-crippling
expense for many amateur sports associations, there is the alternative of random drug
testing as opposed to testing every athlete. The benefit of random drug testing is that it
has a similar PES-deterring effect as absolute testing at a fraction of the cost.
Furthermore, education could potentially have a deterring effect, since most PESs have
logical consequences. Even with random drug testing and education, the cost of anti-
doping is something that anti-doping advocates have to address.
Testing is Psychologically Oppressive
Another argument against anti-doping regulation is that testing for PESs places an
unjustifiable amount of psychological pressure on athletes. Most anti-doping policies
require athletes to be accessible all of the time for random testing, which surely is a
nuisance. Although random drug testing is not unique to athletics (for example, airline
pilots are tested), athletes are perhaps the most superstitious and have the most sensitive
psyches in relation to other professional careers. Although, athletes are psychologically
susceptible, they are also known to be psychologically resilient when competing, as
demonstrated by clutch-plays. Nevertheless, regulators need to remember that confidence
is one of the greatest assets to an athlete.
Technology is More Threatening to Sport Than PESs
Relating to the level-playing-field ideology, there is the belief that the
advancement of sporting equipment is more threatening to the integrity of sport than
PESs. There have been major advancements in sporting equipment, such as carbon fibre
bicycles, graphite golf clubs, and titanium tennis racquets. The technology of sports
equipment has progressed to the point where sports associations have to create
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boundaries that limit the efficiency of sports equipment. This is illustrated by weight
minimums on race-cars and limits on the “trampoline effect” of golf clubs.
Strength Versus Hand-Eye Coordination
Advocates of this argument state that an increase in doped strength is insignificant
in comparison to the hand-eye coordination required to play professional sport. That is,
doping is a relatively minor problem when placed in the context of an athlete’s talent.
The classic case study for this argument is the Barry Bonds – THG incident: even though
many people were upset with Bonds being associated with THG, some felt that Bonds’
biggest asset was not his strength, but rather his ability to make contact with a baseball. It
has been argued, “[We] don’t care if Barry used steroids, hitting a baseball out of the park
756 times is still impressive” (Smith 2005: 48). This is a good point considering that
baseball players cannot hit a homerun if they cannot hit the ball; however, the increased
strength that results from steroid use does allow for a great margin of error. In close, the
strength versus hand-eye coordination argument is only applicable to sports that require
hand-eye coordination. It does not apply to pure power sports such as weightlifting and
sprinting.
The Regulation of PESs Creates Double Standards
Another impediment for anti-doping regulation is the double standards that occur
between sports and other social groups. The double standards exist in two main forms:
the double standard between athletes and artists15; and the one between athletes and civil
society.
Athletes v Artists
First is the double standard that exists between athletes and artists / musicians.
Artists who openly use PESs to create masterpieces are rarely stigmatised and are often
                                                 
15 In the case of artists and entertainers, PESs are recreational drugs that allow an artist to
create something that they would have not been able to create without the aid of that
drug.
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glorified (as opposed to athletes who are often vilified for using PESs). Cashmore (2000)
points out this distinction by using the example of the band the Red Hot Chili Peppers:
The shaming of a sports performer found to have used drugs and the nullifying of
his or her performance is a deterrent or a warned to the young: ‘do this and you
will suffer the same fate’. But the Red Hot Chili Peppers are not disgraced and
their albums would not be expunged from the charts if it were discovered that
they recorded them while using coke (Cashmore 2000: 213).
This raises the question: why are artists and athletes, both of which are entertainers and
have similar influence in society, treated differently for using PESs? Furthermore, it
could be argued that athletes are more responsible with PESs, since misuse is more
jeopardizing to an athletes livelihood than an artists. This could be counter-argued by
stating that regulators also need to eradicate drugs from art; however, the music of the
Beatles (who used illicit substances through their career) and the theories of Sigmund
Freud (who used cocaine) were both influence by illegal drugs and their work has not
been discredited (Stark 2005: 170-183; Karch 1998: 43-5)16. If drugs are eliminated,
society could potentially be jeopardizing a principle source of creativity and innovation.
Sports-romantics seemingly want to keep sport’s playing field level by eliminating PESs;
however, society benefits from innovation: perhaps PESs should be perceived as sport’s
next innovation.
Another double standard exists between in regard to random drug testing. At
present, the vast majority of individuals who have influential occupations (actors,
musicians, politicians, etc) are not subject to random drug tests with the exception of
athletes. It is understood that athletes need to be randomly tested for PESs to keep the
playing field level; however, some sports associations are now testing for recreational
drugs that do not increase performance. This is a regulatory area that has traditionally
                                                 
16 The Beatles experimented with many recreational drugs during their career including
Marijuana, Dexedrine, Preludin, Cocaine and LSD (Stark 2005: 170-183). Freud
experimented and published a book on cocaine titled: On Coca. Interestingly he
recommended seven conditions where cocaine treatment might prove useful: “1) as a
mental stimulant, 2) as a possible treatment for digestive disorders, 3) as an appetite
stimulant in cases of wasting diseases, 4) in the treatment of morphine and alcohol
addiction, 5) as a treatment for asthma, 6) as an aphrodisiac, and 7) as a local anaesthetic”
(Karch 1998: 45).
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been reserved for the state. It is understood that sports associations feel recreational drugs
are ethically impermissible; however, many athletes feel they are being singled out and
that anti-doping regulators are overstepping their boundaries. The classic case for this
argument is that of Ross Rebliati. Rebliati is a Canadian Snowboarder who won an
Olympic medal, tested positive for cannabinoids, had his medal revoked, then had the
medal reinstated because cannabinoids were not banned at the time.
PESs Versus A Performance Enhanced Society
A second double standard exists between society and athletics in relation to PESs:
performance-enhanced athletes are being ridiculed by performance-enhanced societies
(Poniewozik 2004: 92). Rea elaborates:
The public and media alike give themselves allowances we do not give our
heroes and idols. The public can use erectile function and libido drugs, have
plastic surgery to enhance breast and penile size, use liposuction to lose fat that a
quality diet would remove and maintain. Then we tell our athletes to perform at
superhuman levels without any means of superhuman recovery. How is that
ethical? We live under a double standard and fail to accept it when others do not
agree” (Rea in Carroll 2005: 193).
One other example of societal performance enhancement is students improving their
ability to focus with Ritalin (methylphenidate). These forms of enhancement are rarely
viewed as immoral; therefore, how can it be justified that an athlete who takes caffeine to
enhance performance is sinister and a celebrity who gets a face-lift is sublime?
Another example of this form of double standard is their application in the
military. In regards to creating a verdict on the acceptability of a PES in the military, an
ethicist will likely compromise by permitting a potentially health-complicating PESs, if it
can save soldiers’ lives. Similar to medicine, this example illustrates how some of the
technologies used by dopers are ethically acceptable when placed in a different context.
Although the “setting a good example for children” argument is certainly noble, it
is also full of irony. Citing the examples of Ritalin, Viagra, and plastic surgery,
performance-enhancing technologies dominate society, so why should athletics be treated
differently? There is the desire to keep the playing field level; however, it could be
argued that the progression of sports science has already compromised that possibility.
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Therefore, if sports purists want to add an asterisk to Barry Bonds homerun record,
perhaps society should add an asterisk next to all its notable achievements (Poniewozik,
2004: 92).
Athletes are Genetic Freaks
The argument exists: “Sport at its highest level should be viewed as a competition
waged among genetic freaks” (Johnson in Sokolove 2004: 32). The former is an accurate
description: athletes usually fall in the top percentile in size, height, endurance or
whatever trait is advantageous in their respective discipline. This creates notable
implications. Firstly, the reason spectators watch sports is they want to see humans
perform super-human feats; therefore, the more super-human an athletes is, the more fans
are fascinated (citing Michael “Air” Jordan’s (NBA) leaping ability and 7’6” Yao Ming’s
(NBA) extraordinary size). Using this logic, it is understood why MLB ignored the
steroid problem when it was first discovered: fans were spending a lot of money to watch
baseball players (with the aid of science) push the levels of human performance.
Since many fans are interested in athletes who perform at super-human levels,
perhaps regulators should encourage doping. Furthermore, since career athletes are
already ‘freaks’ (in the top percentile of physical human ability), perhaps they should be
allowed enhance their bodies further? Although complications to an athlete’s health
provide an adequate governor for most existing PESs, genetic PESs will have all of the
positive effects of first-generation PESs with few of the negative effects. In summary, the
genetic freaks argument is powerful because it highlights the conflict-of-interest
surrounding PESs: spectators like to watch athletes perform at super-human levels –
PESs allow this possibility. On the other hand, society perceives PESs as unethical; this
creates a puzzling situation.
Regulating PESs Makes the Playing Field Uneven
In response to the level-the-playing-field argument, there exists the counter-
argument: Due to of the constant progression and innovation of PESs, regulators will
never be able to fully eradicate drugs from sport; therefore, by attempting to regulate
PESs, policy makers are inadvertently widening the distribution of performance between
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dopers and “clean” athletes. In other words, the athletes which regulators are most likely
to detect are amateur dopers who use obsolete substances, while the experienced dopers,
who use the latest doping technology, will be able to dope without being detected.
Doping is Good for Sport
Perhaps the most obvious counter-argument to regulating PESs is doping is good
for sport. This is the perspective of bio-ethicist Andy Miah when discussing genetic
doping. Miah (2005) states:
The idea of a naturally [un-doped] perfect athlete is romantic nonsense. An
athlete achieves what he or she achieves through all sorts of means – technology,
sponsorship, support and so on. Utilizing genetic modification [or other forms of
enhancement] is merely a continuation of the way sport works. It allows us to
create more extraordinary performances (Miah in New Zealand Sports Drug
Agency 2005).
Although Miah’s remarks do not apply to existing technologies, they do highlight the
growing tolerance of PESs. Miah’s reputation as a leading genetic bio-ethicist in the field
of performance enhancement and author of one of the few books on the subject
(Genetically Modified Athletes) further legitimise the argument.
Nobody Cares if Athletes Dope
Another argument that weakens the justification for regulating PESs is the belief
that no one cares if athletes dope. This perspective is becoming more commonplace: for
example, according to Sports Illustrated, 41% of those under 30 years old do not care if
an athlete uses steroids (Smith 2005: 43). This raises the question: If nobody cares or
pays attention to doping, why should it be regulated?
Regulation is Futile
In the future, policy makers are going to be presented with the problem of trying
to regulate substances that are undetectable. Although regulators can still detect most
existing PESs, it is difficult to know when doping technology has out-paced testing
methods. This point is illustrated by the THG scandal, where regulators had no idea that
THG existed until a sample was turned over (Fish 2003). The reactionary nature of dope
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testing is flawed: PESs need to exist and be known before they can be monitored.
Therefore, it is imperative that regulators look for alternate strategies to control doping.
Comparing Existing Anti-Doping Policies17
Another piece of information that is needed in order to discuss why there is
variation in anti-doping policies is introducting current policies; after all, how can one
explain variance of policies before understanding what variances exist? Anti-doping
policies range from no policy (the PGA), to what many would consider the most rigorous
anti-doping policy (IOC and WADA). This exercise also points out the various
philosophies in anti-doping, and highlights the strengths and weaknesses of each. Finally,
four bills proposed to the US Congress illustrate the Government’s attempt to control
doping.
The Professional Golfers’ Association: No Policy
Despite the recent scrutiny towards weak anti-doping policies, there are examples
of athletic associations not having a policy18. In the case of the PGA, authorities felt that
PESs are not conducive to golf, since golf is a game almost exclusively of hand-eye
coordination and experience. PGA commissioner Tim Finchem states, “Some say we
ought to be testing for drugs because all sports test and you want to know you’re
clean…In a vacuum, I see how you can make that argument. But honestly, I don’t know
what we would be testing for” (www.golftoday.co.uk 2005). Since golf has always been
regarded as a gentlemen’s game, encompassing values such as honour and trust, the
                                                 
17 Locating the anti-doping policies of the professional American sports associations was
both interesting and frustrating (I was able to quickly locate the IOC’s and WADA’s
policies on their websites). In search of the policies, I investigated the Internet, including
searching through search-engines and sifting through the websites of the NBA, MLB, and
NFL. I then contacted several authors of well-known books in the field, contacted
WADA, and wrote emails to the respective leagues. Finally, I contacted the USADA and
was notified that anti-doping policies were included in the player’s collective bargaining
agreement, and could be found on the player’s union websites of the respective leagues.
However, I found it interesting that MLB was very protective of its current anti-doping
policy and would not release it without applying in writing.
18 The paper refers to the American PGA. This distinction needs to be made because
apparently there is an anti-doping policy for golfing in New Zealand.
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argument has been made that imposing dope testing without probable cause would
compromise the values of the game. Additionally, by not testing for PESs, golf also
reduces its expenditure: an obvious benefit to a sport that seemingly does not have a
problem with PESs.
The International Olympic Committee and World Anti-Doping Agency:
Rigorous Policy
At the other end of the doping spectrum are the anti-doping policies of the IOC
and WADA. A group led by the IOC created WADA in 1999 (it opened in 2000) and the
two organizations work closely together on anti-doping. In 2004, WADA established an
anti-doping code that has been adopted by most international sporting bodies, with the
exception of powerful American sports associations, such as the NFL, NBA and MLB.
WADA’s code is comprehensive, stating testing procedures for both in-and out-of-
competition, the rights of athletes, and penalties for doping. According to both WADA
and the IOC, if an athlete is convicted of doping, the penalty for a first offence is a two-
year suspension and for the second conviction it is a lifetime suspension (WADA 2005).
In addition to having the tightest regulations on doping, the IOC and WADA also have
the most experience with doping, since the IOC created its first banned substance list in
1963.
In regards to the length of suspension, it could be argued that the IOC policy is
too severe, since the window of maximum performance for many athletes is small. In
some cases, such as gymnastics, a two-year suspension could be the length of an athlete’s
career. Conversely, other athletic events, such as archery, rifleman and curlers, have
careers that can span for decades, thus raising questions of fairness.
On the other hand, some feel that a two-year suspension is fair, since an
individual is responsible for all substances ingested; however, athletes are given so many
supplements that it is difficult for them to know exactly what they are taking (as
illustrated by Bonds).
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Major League Baseball: Ineffective Policy
Although the anti-doping policies of the PGA and WADA differ in approach, they
are relatively effective in the contexts that they are implemented. However, there are
examples of sports associations consciously ignoring their doping problem, such as MLB.
During the late 1990s, the steroid problem in MLB baseball escalated; however, MLB
ignored the problem, possibly because they were trying to financially recover from the
strike in 1994-199519.
The history of MLB’s anti-doping policy is short and could be considered
reckless. Before 2002 there was no anti-doping policy in baseball; this is a fact that
players accused of doping are quick to point out, because any prosecution relating to
PESs before 2002 is omissible. In 2003, the players and owners agreed to conduct an
anonymous survey to see how many players were taking steroids. They agreed that if
more than 5% of players were using steroids, they would implement formal testing and
penalties: according to MLB, the test came back between 5% and 7% (Bodley 2005). In
2004, MLB issued its first anti-doping policy consisting of one annual test. It stipulated
that testing continue until steroid use drops below 2.5% for two consecutive years. The
following are the 2004 MLB penalties for doping:
i. First positive test: counselling
ii. Second positive test: 15-day suspension & up to a US$10,000 fine
iii. Third positive test: 25-day suspension & up to a US$25,000 fine
iv. Fourth positive test: 50-day suspension & up to a US$50,000 fine
v. Fifth positive test: One year suspension & up to a US$100,000 fine
Note: all suspensions are without pay
(Bodley 2005))
There are a couple of major flaws in this policy: firstly, the performance
enhancing effect of a PES can be experienced long after termination of usage (perhaps
even years with proper management); therefore, athletes who have been penalized still
experience the benefits of doping after their suspension is over. Secondly, and coinciding
with the first shortcoming, the policy implies that even if athletes are convicted during
                                                 
19 MLB claims that in terms of overall revenue, it has lost money every year since the
strike. Furthermore, the television for the ratings for the World Series has decreased 33%
on average since before the strike (Helfand 2005).
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every yearly test (which is unlikely because of masking agents and the cyclical nature of
PESs), they can still dope with relatively little punishment until the fifth year. Thirdly,
the anti-doping fines relative to the salary of the average MLB player are insignificant:
the average salary of the League is US$2.7 million per year (MLB Players Association
2007). In sum, MLB is effectively telling players that they have two options: do not use
PESs and take your chances competing against the other players who do use them; or,
take PESs, reap substantial financial rewards, and if you get caught, you will be fined a
fraction of your salary and take a 10 day vacation. This policy is a joke20.
Because of the inadequacies of the 2004 anti-doping policy, MLB revised its
policy for the 2005 season. The new policy includes unlimited, unannounced and off-
season testing. The banned substances list has also been expanded to include many other
PESs rather than focusing on steroids. The penalties for the 2005 MLB are:
i. First positive test: 10-day suspension
ii. Second positive test: 30-day suspension
iii. Third positive test: 60-day suspension
iv. Fourth positive test: one year suspension
Note: all suspensions are without pay
(Bodley 2005).
This is admittedly a big improvement on the 2004 policy; however, there remain many
flaws in the 2005 policy. Firstly, there is no minimum amount of tests a player can
receive in a year; therefore, the League can choose to not test certain players. Secondly, if
players are suspended in 2005 for using a PES, they have a longer vacation in relation to
the 2004 policy and no fine (except for pay withheld). Although the 2005 policy is more
stringent, it is still inadequate when compared to other anti-doping policies. The World
Anti-Doping Agency founding chair, Dick Pound, described MLB’s 2005 anti-doping
policy as: “worse than a joke. It is a travesty. It amounts to almost the complete
abandonment of responsibility with respect to health of the participating athletes”
(McCloskey & Bailes 2005: 74).
                                                 
20 It is noted that the players also forfeit their salaries during the time that they are
suspended; however, it is still insignificant when compared to the alternative.
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The next progression in MLB’s anti-doping policy came in the form of a United
States Federal Subpoena. On the 17 March 2005, a representation of players and officials
had to testify in front of a federal court about steroids in baseball. It led to some
interesting testimony: the representatives from MLB dodged questions by restating
previously rehearsed answers. Interestingly, one of the players who testified that he had
never used steroids at the hearing, baseball player Rafael Palmeiro, was later suspended
for using an illegal substance. The developments from this hearing prompted a
professional-sport-wide investigation on the use of PESs in sport (Committee on Energy
and Commerce – US House of Representatives 2005).
Due to the pressure placed on them by the spectators, the media and the US
Federal Government, MLB was forced again to re-visit its anti-doping policy. The new
policy is significantly better with first-time offenders receiving at 50-game suspension
(nearly 1/3 of the season). The punishment for second and third time offenders is 100-
games and lifetime respectively. The policy has already taken affect and a few players
have received 50-game suspensions21. Despite the improvement in policy, there continues
to be a significant difference in standards between MLB and WADA.
One final shortcoming of MLB’s anti-doping policy is the overlooking of the
amphetamine problem in baseball. As previously stated, in a recent survey conducted by
USA Today, 87.2% of players polled said that amphetamine use exists in the big leagues
and 35.3% said that at least half the players use amphetamines (Hohler 2005). MLB’s
tolerance of amphetamines is unacceptable by IOC standards and the players using them
would be suspended if they competed under an Olympic umbrella. This highlights the
inconsistencies of anti-doping policies and the need for harmonized policy22.
                                                 
21 Florida Marlins pitcher, Juan Salas was punished under these new suspensions
(espn.com 2007).
22 Harmonization will be discussed later.
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Table 2.2: Suspension Length of MLB’s Anti-Doping Policy
________________________________________________________________________
Offence Pre-2003 2004 2005 Current
1st Offence None 15 Day 10 Day 50 Game
2nd Offence None 25 Day 30 Day 100 Game
3rd Offence None 50 Day 60 Day Lifetime
4th Offence None 1 Year 1 Year
Source: (Bodley 2005)
Table 2.3: Doping Suspensions for American Sports Associations
________________________________________________________________________
Offence USADA MLB NFL NBA NHL
1st Offence 2 Years 50 Game 4 Game 5 Game 20 Game
2nd Offence Lifetime 100 Game 8 Game 25 Game 60 Game
3rd Offence Lifetime 1 Year 1 Year Lifetime
4th Offence Lifetime
Note: the MLB, NFL, NBA, and NHL anti-doping policies are in their respective collective
bargaining agreements. WADA’s and USADA’s policies are available on their websites.
Sources: MLBPA.com; NFLPA.com; NBAPA.com; NHLPA.com; WADA.com; USADA.com
Proposed Federal Anti-Doping Policies in the United States23
The weak anti-doping policies of professional sports associations in the US have
led to a series of Federal interventions. Although a number of bills have been introduced,
this paper looks at four pieces of legislation that illustrate the change in the Federal
Government’s attitude toward doping. These bills include: the Amateur Sports Integrity
                                                 
23 “At an international level, the Anti-doping Convention of the Council of Europe is the
only legally binding document referring to doping, to which there are 32 member country
signatories” (BMA 2002: 6).
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Act of 2003, the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004, the Drug Free Sports Act of
2005, and the Clean Sports Act of 2005.
The Amateur Sports Integrity Act of 2003 [S. 1002]
In 2003, the Amateur Sports Integrity Act was proposed (by Senators McCain,
Brownback, Edwards, and Graham) to uphold the integrity of amateur sport and to
research PESs. The main purpose of bill was to reduce gambling on amateur sports, but
the bill also included a series of grants for scientific groups conducting research relevant
to doping. It was proposed that US$28 million over the period of four years (2004-08) be
allotted for research (US Congress 2003).
The Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004 [S. 2195]
The Anabolic Steroids Control Act could be considered the first proposed
legislation to specifically target PESs. Co-authored by Senators Biden and Hatch, it is
designed to eliminate steroids from a non-medical environment24. Senator Hatch
described the bill as follows:
Under this bill, clever chemists will no longer be able to dodge the law by
disguising their chemicals to skirt the legal definition of a steroid…Our
bill gives the Drug Enforcement Agency the power to schedule nearly any
steroid precursor or in the future – giving the law the flexibility that we
don’t have to play catch-up with every new Andro look-alike that comes
along (Congress Passes Steroid…Nutrabio.com 2004).
Accordingly, the bill lists 43 substances that are considered steroids by the Federal
Government. In regards to punishments, the bill does not establish a fine or prison
sentence, but does state that the case will be reviewed by the United States Sentencing
Commission. Furthermore, the bill also mandates prevention and education programmes,
authorizing US$15 million of government spending for each fiscal year from 2005 to
2010. Finally, the bill includes funding for a national survey on steroid use and the
                                                 
24 Steroids are used in medicine as a remedy to muscle-degenerative diseases such as
AIDS.
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implications on health (US Congress 2004). The bill was passed on October 8, 2004
(Govtrack.us 2007).
The Drug Free Sports Act of 2005 [H.R. 1862]
The Drug Free Sports Act is one of two similar bills introduced to eliminate PESs
from sport. It is a more aggressive approach to legislation in relation to the Anabolic
Steroids Control Act: it targets all PESs. The bill establishes a uniform banned substance
list, standardized testing, and universal punishments for dopers. In relation to the Clean
Sports Act (its rival bill – to be discussed next), it is less coercive: it requires only two
tests a year; does not require that professional sports associations adhere to Olympic
Standards; does not require a designer steroids policy from professional sports; and does
not focus on collegiate and high school sports (US Congress 2005). It was introduced by
Representative Stearns on 28 June 2005 but was never passed (GovTrack 2007).
The Clean Sports Act of 2005 [H.R. 2565]
Finally, the Clean Sports Act of 2005 (proposed by McCain, Davis and Waxman)
is designed to strengthen testing procedures and toughen penalties for using PESs in the
major American sports associations. In relation to the Drug Free Sports Act, the Clean
Sports Act is a more aggressive approach to controlling PESs. The bill proposes the
following: the major sports associations in America adopt the standards of the USADA
(similar to WADA); that athletes are tested five times per year (three in-season and two
off-season); that all banned substances are tested for during each examination; and that
refusing to take a test is treated as a positive test. Penalties for testing positive coincide
with Olympic standards, with a two-year suspension for the first offence and a lifetime
ban for the second offence. Sentences can be reduced if athletes can prove that they
inadvertently doped or they assist in identifying other dopers (US Congress 2005). The
bill was never passed (GovTrack.us 2007).
The Difficulties of Implementing Anti-Doping Policy
Also relevant to this paper is an explanation of the obstacles that have hindered
the implementation of anti-doping policy. This grants insight to the logic used by various
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sports associations when creating anti-doping policy. Obstacles such as international
politics, finance, legality, and definitions have all influenced how anti-doping policy is
created and sculpted.
Sluggish Adoption of Policy: the Cold War
Richard Pound of WADA says the adoption of anti-doping policy was sluggish
because of its link to international relations. During the Cold War, anti-doping policy was
neglected because no country wanted to offend another by accusing them of doping or
cheating. Because of the diplomatic tensions of the Cold War and the threat of nuclear
war, regulators thought it was best to ignore doping; however, ignoring the problem
during the Cold War has made implementing policy much more difficult at present. Even
though a well-meaning anti-doping policy was in place during the 1960s, doping was
allowed to remain largely unbridled until the 1990s. Pound states, “We looked the other
way, and it [the PES problem] snowballed” (Pound in Sokolove 2004: 33).
Reluctance of Professional Sports to Adopt Anti-Doping Policy
A second complication in successfully implementing anti-doping policy is the
lack of cooperation by professional sports associations to adopt and police new anti-
doping legislation. Although this is highly visible in leagues like MLB, it happens even at
the Olympic level; nine-time U.S. Olympic gold medallist Carl Lewis stated in 1999:
Federations at every level are covering up drugs and covering up for people…it’s
a joke. It’s a credibility factor and it starts at the top. Sadly enough, America is
right in the middle of it… The commitment to find drugs is not there. There are
much better ways to test than they are doing, but . . . they don’t want to catch
anyone in the first place (Lewis in McCloskey & Bailes 2005: 38).
The reason for neglect is two-fold: scandal is not good for sport; and, PESs allow athletes
the ability to perform at more super-human levels, which is the reason why many
spectators watch sport. The Federal Government is currently addressing the reluctance of
professional sports associations to enforce anti-doping policy.
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Conflicting Legal Status of PESs
The ambiguous legal status of PESs in America creates problems for regulations.
Carroll explains: 
In some states, such as Rhode Island, both AAS and growth hormone are
controlled substances. Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has gone out of its way to
say that growth hormone ‘shall not be included as an anabolic steroid’. Let’s take
the typical first-time possession of a small quality of ‘juice’ for personal use. In
Connecticut it’s a misdemeanour, in which case there’s imprisonment. In Arizona
it’s technically a felony, but under a new law eligible offenders get probation
with drug treatment in lieu of prison (Carroll 2005: 180).
In sum, the legal ambiguity has confused individuals about the seriousness of
PESs. Before regulators can have an impact on PESs, they need to create solid ethical
footing in the way that federal governments punish for possessing and supplying PESs.
Dietary-Supplement Industry
Another impediment restricting anti-doping policy is the dietary-supplement
industry. The US$18 billion-a-year dietary-supplementary industry is loosely regulated
and has flooded the market with substances that claim to improve performance (Sokolove
2004: 31). The problem with dietary-supplements is two-fold: firstly, because of the
number and range of the products, it is argued that the public can no longer distinguish
between legal and illegal PESs, thus gaining a tolerance for both. Secondly, dietary
supplements are arguably a gateway drug to more serious PESs, such as steroids, thus
exacerbating the doping problem. Although it is not an easy task, regulators need to
develop a strategy to inform the public of the boundary between legal and illegal PESs.
Cost
As previously stated, dope tests range in cost from US $100 - $500; this is a
significant obstacle for amateur sports, especially at the high school level where sports
programs run on a shoe-string budget. At the professional level, if MLB (for example)
invested a million dollars a year into testing, they could give every player a
comprehensive anti-dope test ($200 per player) three times a year and have money left
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over for research and education. Although this might sound expensive, a million dollars a
year seems almost insignificant in a league were the average salary for a player is over
US $2.6 million (Black in Carroll 2005: 104; MLB Players Association 2007)
Staying Ahead of the Cheaters
As discussed, the success of anti-doping policy hinges on the ability to test for
PESs. Sokolove (2004) states that the future of testing for PESs is bleak, because “rogue
scientists and coach-gurus have been winning [when using and disguising PESs] for
years, and they have ever more tools available to them” (Sokolove 2004: 32). However,
some optimistically counter-argue that if scientists can create a PES, than they can detect
it.
As for the specific strategy used to catch dopers, regulators currently use a
targeting approach, which means they predetermine what substances to test. This method
is opposed to non-targeted testing were regulators test for everything that is available
(obviously more expensive). Dr. David Black (President of Aegis Sciences Corporation,
which is one of the few companies certified by the US Government to conduct doping
testing) states, “Cost usually drives the decision to test of particular drugs. So yes, those
who choose to cheat know what we are targeting, what drugs we are trying to identify.
They look for drugs within the same drug class that are not currently being targeted”
(Black in Carroll 2005: 99). In sum, scientists’ struggle to stay ahead of dopers poses a
significant hurdle to regulators.
Defining Boundaries
As previously discussed, drawing the boundary of acceptability is one of the most
difficult and subjective aspects of creating policy. There are at least two boundaries that
create problems: defining the word “dope / doping”; and, drawing the line between
therapy and enhancement. As mentioned, anti-doping policy largely hinges on the word
“intention”. If it is not used, athletes can be punished for honestly not knowing they were
using a banned substance. If it is used, it provides a loophole (ignorance) for dopers.
The other philosophical obstacle weakening anti-doping policy is drawing an
ethical distinction between therapy and enhancement. Miah (2004) states, “The problem
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is not simply that there is trouble distinguishing between therapy and enhancement,
where the former is ethical and the latter is unethical…there is also the problem of
delimiting which kinds of therapy and which kinds of enhancement are acceptable, since
within each of these categories, there is room for concluding varying degrees of
acceptability” (Miah 2004: 115). Although making the distinction between therapy and
enhancement is difficult, it is necessary if regulators are going to effectively combat
doping. To quote Pound, “The line needs to be drawn somewhere” (in Sokolove 2004:
48).
In closing, this chapter introduced the history, mechanisms, and influences that
influence anti-doping policy. It grants the reader the necessary knowledge to understand
the theory and discussion sections of this paper.
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Chapter III:
Theory & Method
Purpose
As one can tell by the previous two chapters, there has been a great deal written
on the subject of doping. To this point, factual information has been the main focus of
authors and regulators. For example, many texts discuss the history and statistics of
doping. Furthermore, many authors have found the ethics of doping interesting, since
there is much to debate. However, one gap in the literature of anti-doping policy is the
agendas behind various anti-doping policies. This paper aims to fill that gap by
discussing the reasons why professional and amateur anti-doping policies are so different.
The reason that there is variation between professional and Olympic anti-doping
policies is because they have two different agendas. Olympic anti-doping policies are
designed to preserve the “moral righteousness of sport” (although contestable).
Conversely, professional anti-doping policies are designed to satisfy their financial
supporters. This requires a balance between pleasing fans expectations with a sufficient
anti-doping policy, while simultaneously allowing athletes to use acceptable technologies
to push the boundaries of human performance.
Cases
The cases used in this paper are anti-doping policies of major professional sports
associations in the United States, such as MLB, NFL, NBA, PGA, and NHL.
Furthermore, the anti-doping policies of amateur sports associations such as the NCAA,
WADA, and the IOC are also analysed. Although all of these anti-doping policies are
mentioned, the paper mainly focuses on the anti-doping policies of WADA / the IOC and
MLB, since they receive the most attention. WADA’s policy is often referred to when
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discussing amateur anti-doping policy, since it has been referred to as the pinnacle of
anti-doping policies. MLB’s policy is often cited when discussing professional anti-
doping policy because ofthe perception that MLB’s anti-doping policy is the weakest and
perhaps the most token of all of the American professional sports.
Method
The method used in this thesis is the Most Similar Systems (MSS) design of
comparative analysis (a.k.a. focus comparison). MSS is a form of non-experimental
scientific method that bridges the gap between the case study method (which focuses on
one case) and the statistical method (which focuses on multiple cases). Accordingly, MSS
is usually applied when using a two to three cases that share many similarities. This
method is typically used for comparative politics between countries; however, its
principals can also be used to compare other fields, such as professional and amateur
sport.
The technique of MSS is rooted in J.S. Mill’s (1843) method of difference, which
aims to identify key differentiating features between two bodies that are mostly similar
(Landman 2003: 29). Studies that use this method are often referred to as more intensive
and less extensive, since they tend to be quite focused. Furthermore, the outcomes from
MSS are configurative, since usually a few causal factors act together rather than a lone
factor (ibid: 29). Accordingly, this paper states that three causal factors are responsible
for the variation between professional and amateur anti-doping policies. In sum, MSS is
used to identify similarities and differences between two bodies and highlight a political
outcome (ibid: 29). The following graphic illustrates how MSS works:
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Table 4.1: Most Similar System of Design
Feature Group #1 Group #2
A A
B B
C C
Key Explanatory Factors X Not X
Outcome to be Explained Y Not Y
Source: (Landman 2003: 30)
It should also be noted that there exists a complementary system called Most
Different Systems of Design (MDS or MDSD). MDS systems works just the opposite as
MSS; that is, it highlights the differences between two or more systems and then states
why a few similarities are responsible for a certain political outcome. The following
graphic further explains this model:
Table 4.2: Most Different System of Design
Feature Group #1 Group #2
A E
B F
C G
Key Explanatory Factors X X
Outcome to be Explained Y Y
Source: (Landman 2003: 30)
If the purpose of this paper is to explain why there is a difference between
professional and amateur anti-doping policy (dependent variables), one must start by
drawing as many similarities between professional and amateur sport as possible. MSS is
an appropriate method because professional and amateur sports are mostly similar
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regulatory areas. Both fields have similar rules, have similar structures, and face similar
obstacles since professional sport is a derivative of amateur sport. Once the links between
professional and amateur sport have been drawn, a number of independent variables
become evident. Once the independent variables are identified, the researcher can
hypothesis, research and state how the independent variables result in changing the
dependent variables.
Similar to most methods of analysis, there are some shortcomings with MSS;
Lijphart outlines them in his 1975 article, the Comparable-Cases Strategy in
Comparative Research. The first criticism is aimed at applying MSS to inter-state
phenomena. Przeworski and Teune (1970) state, “Although the number of differences
among similar countries is limited, it will almost invariably be sufficiently large to ‘over-
determine’ the dependent phenomenon” (in Lijphart 1975: 174). It is understood that
when working on a grandiose scale of inter-state action, there would be an overwhelming
number of variables; however, in the case of anti-doping policy, these two areas of
regulation (professional and amateur anti-doping policy) have so few variables that MSS
is an appropriate method.
A second criticism is “the comparative method is said to lead to no more than
partial generalizations, while the real need is to fashion generalizations of universal scope
and validity” (Lijphart 1975: 172). This criticism certainly is valid; however, Lijphart is
quick to point out that partial generalizations are better than nothing when generalizations
of universal scope and validity are not available. In regard to anti-doping policy, since it a
relatively new regulatory area (less than 50 years old), and comparing anti-doping
policies are even newer (10 years), the comparison method creates footholds for larger
and more substantial generalizations in the future.
Holt and Turner who argue, “Comparable cases are so rare that the research site is
likely to dictate the hypothesis” raise a final criticism of the comparative method (1970:
13 in Lijphart 1975: 172-3). In other words, Holt and Turner believe that firstly there are
very few comparable cases, and secondly, believe that this method is not scientific in
design and the researcher will discover whatever they hypothesized, rather than what
actually exists. This is a very legitimate concern; however, it is a concern that could be
applied to several other methods of research and it is a concern that will always be voiced
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by advocates of quantitative analysis. In response, I prefer the comparative method over
the statistical method because I feel it best fits the field of anti-doping policy.
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Chapter IV:
Analysis and Discussion
As mentioned, this paper seeks to discover why there is variation between
professional and amateur anti-doping policies by using the Most Similar Systems Method
of analysis. Accordingly, the forth chapter starts by establishing professional and amateur
sport as a most similar system. Then, the independent variables of perception,
management and finance are explained. This accentuates why the dependent variable
(anti-doping polices) can be dramatically different even though professional and amateur
sport are mostly similar.
Professional and Amateur Sport: A Most Similar System
According to MSS, before one can isolate determining factors, the bodies being
compared must be established as mostly similar. It is logical to conclude that there are a
number of similarities between the two, since professional sport evolved from amateur
sport. Rather than list all the similarities between professional and amateur sport, six
major similarities are listed to avoid sounding monotonous.
Firstly, both professional and amateur sports have explicit rules that govern how
they are played. These rules are formally written and if a participant chooses not to play
by those rules, they are punished. Both professional and amateur sports have implicit
rules as well, such as etiquette that are not always regulated, but are expected of
participants. It should also be noted that there are subtle rule variations between
professional and amateur sport, such as a deeper three-point line in professional
basketball, or relaxed penalties on touchdown celebrations in American football.
However, these rule changes do not radically change the way that these games are
played; rather, they make the game more entertaining to please spectators.
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Both professional and amateur athletics use similar equipment. Again, there is
some subtle variation of materials between the ranks; however, the fundamental
parameters remain similar. For example, MLB only uses wood bats to increase batting
difficulty, whereas amateurs are allowed to use bats made of other substances, such as
aluminium. However, both professional and amateur baseball players use bats of similar
size and shape to play. In sum, the variation of materials of bats in baseball does not
radically change how the game is played.
The investment of time in training for professional or amateur sport is mostly
similar. Professionals do spend more time training since that is their job; however, in
regard to personal sacrifice, amateur athletes have a similar experience, since they have
to plan around other commitments such as work. Perhaps the argument could be made
that amateur training is more difficult because of other commitments. Without getting too
caught up in the argument, both professional and amateur athletes have to spend time
training to excel at their discipline.
Both professional and amateur athletes are the subjects of coaching. In general,
the strategies that professional and amateur athletes use are similar. The most significant
difference between the coaching between the ranks is professional coaches typically have
better mastery of the nuances. For example, there are some fundamental characteristics
that make for a good golf swing; the difference is a professional coach understands subtle
variations that make that swing more efficient and accurate. Another constant between
professional and amateur sport coaching is at both levels the success of an athlete is
governed by the relationship between the athlete and the coach.
Depending on the marketability of sport, both professional and amateur athletes
receive television coverage. There are even many instances were amateur sport receives
more media hype than professional sport. For example, College Bowl Week (NCAA
football) and March Madness (NCAA Basketball) are some of the biggest sporting events
on the American sports calendar. The championship games of each tournament have a
Nielsen rating ranging from 14-30 and receipts from the tournaments are in excess of
$US200 million and growing (Smith 2001: 190, 198). Therefore, gifted athletes become
acquainted with the media starting around high school. On the other hand, professional
athletes obviously have extensive experience with the media.
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Finally, both professional and amateur sport have corporate sponsors. Although it
is sometimes forgotten, amateur sports clubs are allowed to have corporate sponsors that
donate equipment and money. Accordingly, most top amateurs (such as NCAA or
Olympic athletes) have their equipment donated and logistical costs covered by corporate
sponsors.
In sum, professional and amateur sports are mostly similar. This point is made
easy since professional athletics is rooted in, and would not be possible without, amateur
athletics. That is, it would be almost impossible for professional athletics to exist without
amateur athletics sending  them athletes. Consequently, the structure and philosophies
that exist in amateur athletics are often transposed into professional athletes; however,
some key variations do exist. This provides segue to the next section, which highlights
the few differences between the ranks and explains why those differences result in
different approaches to anti-doping policy.
Independent Variables
Now that professional and amateur sport has been established as a most similar
system, one can now identify the independent variables. Accordingly, this paper
identifies three variables (perception, management, and finance) and explains why they
result in different approaches to anti-doping policy.
Perception: Amateur Sport
There is a difference in the ethical perception of sport between the professional
and amateur ranks. Typically, there is moral righteousness attached with amateur sport.
At the youth level of amateur sport, many believe that the role of sport is to teach
children ethical lessons. Furthermore, sport is a fun way to encourage physical fitness. At
the more elite level of amateur sport, much of the righteousness is preserved; however,
for different reasons. One of the reasons the elite amateur sport is righteous is because of
the international element. Amateur competition at the top-level usually involves multiple
countries, as illustrated by the Olympics and World Cups. Because of the international
element, sport then becomes politicised. The consequence of politicised sport is that
nations then want sport to function in two ways: firstly, governments want amateur
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athletics to embody wholesome morals so that members of society have positive role
models. Secondly, nations want to ensure a level playing field because of the diplomancy
that coincides with international sport. Certainly, there are numerous cases of amateur
athletes exhibiting bad sportsmanship; nevertheless, from a policy standpoint,
international competitions are regulated more heavily for doping.
Perception: Professional Sport
Even though professional sport is expected to uphold a degree of morality, it
certainly is not at the same degree as amateur athletes. Using the United States as an
example, there are numerous cases of professional athletes exhibiting sub-standard
behaviour and the media judging it as acceptable, or worse, victimizing the perpetrator.
Cases include: “Pete Rose was banned from baseball for betting on games; Magic
Johnson, who says he had sex with thousands of women, contracted the virus that causes
AIDS; Boxer Mike Tyson was convicted for rape; and, Steve Howe was banned from
baseball after six previous suspensions and after pleading guilty to a cocaine charge”
(Berkow in Berlow 1994: 32). Although these acts are shameful, professional athletes
typically receive little punishment, are not vilified for any extended period and are
allowed to continue with their careers. Seemingly, there is a growing tolerance for
athletes being bad citizens.
I believe the reason for this tolerance of misbehaviour is because fans of sport
simply do not care. Seemingly, the level of performance supersedes the level of morality
in professional athletics. Fans are more interested in watching super-human feats than
caring about character of the individuals. Fans may complain that they have no control
over the situation; however, they have all the power via their expenditure on sport: if fans
boycotted teams or more harshly stigmatised athletes who doped, doping would diminish.
Management: Amateur Sport
Relating to sports perception is the subject of management. Amateur sport is
typically regulated by local or international associations. At the international level,
regulation is aimed at keeping the playing field level due to the links with diplomacy and
international relations. At all levels, management aims to uphold the moral code that
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sport is meant to embody. One characteristic that most amateur sport shares is that much
of their funding is supported by governments and external contributors; therefore,
amateurs are forced to behave in a manner that pleases their sponsors. This results in
highly controlled policy and low tolerance for those individuals who break protocol.
Management: Professional Sport
Conversely, professional sport is autonomous. Although professionals have to
keep their sponsors happy, there appears to be more forgiveness than the pressure that
amateurs endured from the government and their sponsors; perhaps this is because
professional sport has an ally in the media. Although media sources have an obligation to
report new of players being suspended for using PESs, it is also not in their interest to
make a huge fuss about doping. After all, the profitability of professional sports and the
media companies that are report on them is inherently related. Backing this claim is the
fact that ESPN mainly reports on professional American sport as opposed to amateur or
international competition.
Another significant variation in the management of professional sport is they do
not receive funding from the government. Because the government does not invest in
professional sport, they do not have any leverage to control it. Professional sport
traditionally is not an area of governmental control; however, the recent deaths of
professional, amateur and high school athletes has prompted regulators to take a closer
look at how sport is being regulated. This is illustrated by the US Federal Government
issuing subpoenas to the major American sports associations in 2005 (Committee on
Energy and Commerce – US House of Representatives 2005).
Finance: Amateur Sport
Although corporate sponsorship certainly is present in Amateur Sport, the
majority of funding, especially at the Olympic level, is derived from public sources. For
example, the financial contribution for the Sydney Olympics was US$3154 million public
and US$832 million private (Preuss 2004: 17). Since Olympic programs are funded
mainly by the state, national programs are obligated to conduct themselves according to
the wishes of their governments.
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Finance: Professional Sport
In opposition, professional sport in America operates independently of
government. Seemingly, this equates to catering to the expectations of the fans rather
than a standard of morality. The outcome of having the fans determine what is acceptable
is illustrated by the tolerance of flamboyant touchdown celebrations in professional
football and the toleration of fighting in professional ice hockey. When faced with the
issue of PESs, professional sports associations are faced with a catch-22: on one hand,
performance enhancement creates more of the inhuman feats that fans love to watch
(such as homeruns, big collisions, and acrobatic dunks). On the other hand, if doping gets
out of hand, fans will become disillusioned with sport and professional sport will
financially suffer.
The outcome of this dilemma is varied. Sports such as football where there is a
substantial physical element, regulating bodies were relatively quick to create a banned
substance list and testing procedures. This is because PESs poses more of a health risk in
contact sports due to potential mismatches.
MLB took a different approach; although there are many reasons why baseball did
not create an anti-doping policy sooner, it could be argued that because baseball is not a
collision sport, the ramifications of athletes doping are not as severe as in contact sports.
Another reason why baseball did not create an anti-doping code sooner is that baseball is
a game heavily reliant on hand-eye coordination; therefore, enormous muscle-power does
not benefit a baseball player unless he can make contact with a pitch. This is different to
football were the performance of an athlete is predominately governed by size and speed.
The logic in MLB not creating an anti-doping code is understood: firstly, there is
little risk of an un-doped athlete getting hurt by a doped athlete, since there are few
collisions compared to football. Secondly, batting average should not be affected greatly,
since a player still needs to make contact with the ball for any increase in strength to have
an affect. Thirdly, the baseball statistic that is going to be most greatly influenced is
homeruns, since a boost in strength creates a larger margin of error for a homerun: this of
course is a positive in the eyes of MLB, since homeruns are a fan-favourite.
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The former logic was witnessed in the early 2000s when Sammy Sosa, Mark
McGwire and Barry Bonds were chasing the homerun record. Although there were
multiple rumours that these athletes were using questionable substances to enhance their
batting, fans did not seemed to care: the year when the doping story in baseball was most
publicized, MLB set an all-time attendance record (Weir 2004).
Conclusion
The independent variables of perception, management and finance, are most
responsible for the variation between professional and amateur anti-doping policies. In
lieu of this, question that could be asked is: Does having two different approaches to anti-
doping policy a benefit to society? On one hand, having two different policies allows
consumers to choose what version of competition they enjoy. On the other hand, two
different approaches to anti-doping policies create ethical ambiguity that potentially
confuses athletes and spectators. In my opinion, a universal anti-doping code needs to be
created. In order to do so, the various policy templates and policy mechanisms need to be
examined so that the best policy is constructed: the following does exactly that.
Philosophical Approaches to Anti-Doping Policy
This section outlines the current philosophical approaches to anti-doping policy.
This is done so a reference point is established in preparation for the subsequent section,
which explains the alternatives to the existing framework. All of the approaches have
flaws, so the objective for regulators it to pick mechanisms that work the best.
Existing Method: Negative List
The current philosophical background for anti-doping policy is called a negative
list; it works by stating the substances and methods that an athlete cannot use. For
example, an athlete may not use steroids, or an athlete may not use genetic enhancement.
This method works well when there are a limited number of substances being regulated.
The negative list is advantageous because it grants more freedom to an athlete than other
alternatives, such as the positive list (to be explained below). Negative lists are used by
the IOC, WADA, and a whole range of professional sports bodies.
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However, negative lists are not without their disadvantages. One criticism of
negative lists is that they inadvertently encourage doping. Bird and Wagner illustrate this
point using the metaphor of basketball:
Rules can tactically encourage the behaviour being ruled against: foul shots in
basketball stop the clock and thereby can encourage teams to commit fouls when
they are in desperate need of game time. In the same way, the negative list, in its
utter clarity about banned substances, tacitly encourages doping (Bird & Wagner
1997: 754).
Furthermore, it has been argued that by stating what substance an athlete cannot take,
regulators are introducing athletes to PESs they might not have considered using; that is,
negative lists provide a catalogue of PESs for athletes. Finally, the biggest shortcoming
of a negative list is that it only declares what is illegal, whereas any new substance or
method is legal. Consequently, they encourage the progression of doping and give an
additional advantage to experiended dopers who know how to avoid detection.
Alternatives and Addenda of Anti-Doping Policy
Although the negative list has been the dominant regulatory template, there are
many other alternatives and addenda that could increase the effectiveness of anti-doping
policy. The following section highlights some of these alternatives and comments on the
advantages and disadvantages of each option.
Harmonization
One addition that would improve the effectiveness of anti-doping policy is
harmonization (Miah 2004: 33). This is the idea that all sports bodies should adhere to a
universal anti-doping policy. Currently, each professional sports association in the United
States has its own anti-doping code; thereby creating inconsistencies in the perceptions of
doping across sport. The lack of harmonized policy is especially problematic for athletes
who compete under multiple sporting umbrellas, because the legality of certain
substances can change according to the contest. Gary Wadler summarizes the dilemma
that athletes face before ingesting any substance: “Is it banned? Will it adversely affect
my performance? And, is it safe?” (Wadler 2003: 6). A harmonized policy would shorten
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and simplify this process by making an athlete accountable to one anti-doping code. In
sum, a harmonized anti-doping policy would create: a constant philosophical base,
uniform definitions, a definitive policy, and standard testing methods; this would in turn
lead to a reduction in costs due to standardization. A harmonized anti-doping policy
would create an environment of no surprises, which is something that all stakeholders in
sport would surely appreciate.
Positive List
A positive list works by dictating what methods and substances an athlete can use.
The advantage of a positive list is that it creates a strong policy: any new PES is illegal
because it has not yet been made acceptable by regulators. Subsequently, if policy makers
decide that the substance is ethically and medically permissible, they can add it to their
“acceptable substance list”.
However, there are weaknesses to the positive list: they are much more restrictive
than negative lists, because they dictate exactly what an athlete can take. Furthermore,
civil society governs using negative lists; therefore, it seems unethical to have different
rules for civilians than athletes. A positive list also has the potential to expand and
complicate dope testing. According to a positive list, since everything not on the
acceptable list is illegal, regulators have to test for every substance not on that list, which
could be gigantic depending on the scope. This is opposed to a negative list where
regulators only have to test for banned PESs. Therefore, policing a positive list is more
complicated, more expensive, and more impractical than a negative list.
Drug Diary
The drug diary works by athletes being accountable for their own use of PESs
(Bird & Wagner 1997: 757). In this system, athletes keep a diary of what substances they
take and are subjected to random drug tests to verify their records; an athlete is fined
and/or suspended if the diary and test results do not concur. According to Bird and
Wagner, if this method is used, doping has a new definition: “Doping is any drug that
enhances the athlete’s performance so greatly that he or she is ashamed to admit that he
or she uses it” (Bird & Wagner 1997: 757). This aspect of the drug diary is empowering
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to athletes because it provides the opportunity for athletes to be open about what PESs
they take. The method hinges on athletes being ethically responsible for constructing
their own threshold of doping, which could be positive or negative depending on the
individual. The drug diary is essentially a variant of self-regulation, but there is a degree
of accountability and good-will included. This concept is good, because athletes are
going to be most aware of the implications of emerging PESs, since their livelihoods
depend on it. Furthermore, the accountability characteristic keeps the public aware of
who uses what PES(s), and the good-will aspect makes athletes feel less coerced.
Although the method of the drug diary could be criticised for being naive, it is
also the most obvious way to create transparency in the field of doping. That is, if
regulators are trying to discover what substances athletes are taking, why not just ask? Of
course there will be individuals that are dishonest, but the diary might generate a great
deal of honest data as well. Furthermore, the drug diary would be inexpensive program
relative to the invasive and costly procedures of drug testing.
The major shortcoming of the drug diary is that it makes athletes become
ethicists. It is not to say that athletes are unethical, but by granting athletes the power to
make moral decisions, the drug diary eliminates a check and balance. Also, the drug diary
still requires regulators to test for PESs, thus preserving the cost and inconvenience of
monitoring.
Split Divisions
Another alternative is splitting sport into two divisions: natural and modified. In
this model, the “natural competition” functions like contemporary sport with drug testing
and penalties for using banned substances; however, athletes unhappy with the paradigm
could choose to compete in the modified competition. The modified division (or
unregulated division) would provide an environment where athletes are permitted modify
their bodies using PESs. In sum, the modified division exhibits what the human body is
capable of with the aid of science.
A potential split division would determine what members of the sporting
community are really interested in: purist competitions or super-human feats. Divisions
would reduce the amount of testing in sport, thus reducing the expenditure of monitoring.
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On the other hand, there are many negatives that can arise from split divisions: firstly,
one of the divisions could be eliminated, due to the inability of the market to support both
classes. Secondly, having two divisions of athletes is ethically unsettling and society
might not support it. Thirdly and most importantly, the modified class can potentially
cause a split in humanity. It could create one class of humans (as we currently understand
them), and a second class of super-humans. Although this scenario is currently not a
threat, genetic technologies have this capability.
Deregulation or No Regulation
Deregulation is simple: athletes can take any PES without punishment. According
to this method, regulators have to rely on athletes being mindful of health risks and being
responsible for ethical decisions that influence society. There are many positives that
would result from deregulation: the criminal element of drug use would cease to exist; the
black market would unveil all PESs so that science could intellectually benefit; and, the
expenditure of testing would be eliminated. Furthermore, the invasiveness and
inconvenience of testing would be eradicated; it would arguably level the playing field
because everybody would have equal access to drugs; and, it would eliminate doping
scandals. These ramifications are certainly worth pondering.
Conversely, there are some serious consequences with deregulation as well.
Firstly, although deregulation may work for professional sports in developed countries,
deregulation would create problems in international competitions, since some countries
have better resources available in developing PESs. Secondly, because PESs have the
potential to homogenize the physique of athletes, spectators may lose interest in sport
because they can no longer identify with the individuality of athletes. In other words,
spectators might believe that they are watching robots compete because of the
enhancements made to athletes’ bodies. Thirdly, deregulation may lead to a tolerance of
PESs that might extinguish the positive morals and ethics that coexist within sport:
sportspersons would no longer require a solid work ethic, just a great doctor. Fourthly,
there is the chance of serious health risks for both athletes and the general population. If
PESs continue to be regulated, this will slow the progression of PESs and sends the
message that taking PESs is not acceptable. Conversely, if PESs are deregulated, there
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may be a race in the development of PESs with little thought of ethical and physical
consequences. Finally, the tolerance of PESs could also result in a complete separation of
race: natural humans and super-humans. Although sensationalized, it is a possibility that
ethicists and regulators need to take seriously.
De-Professionalising Sport
A final solution is to de-professionalise sport. This method stipulates that money
be removed from sport: if there are no monetary incentives, doping should logically
subside, since the risk of PESs would far outweigh the reward of capital. Hypothetically,
if sport were de-professionalised, it may lose its win-at-all-cost ideology and return to a
more classic mentality. However, because of its money and lobbying power, it is unlikely
that sport would ever be de-professionalised.
In sum, there is no clear front-running philosophical template for anti-doping
policy: all options have positive and negative attributes. Since there is no way for
regulators to fully control anti-doping and its effects on society, they need to isolate and
focus on what aspects of doping in sport are most crucial in relation to society.
A New Approach to Anti-Doping Policy
One of my goals in writing this paper is to use the knowledge I gained to create a
better anti-doping policy. Accordingly, the following section expands on the templates
and knowledge previously stated to achieve my goal. Addressed are the five elements of
policy: goals, implementers, target groups, instruments, and rationales25, complete with
details and justifications why strategies within those categories would work.
                                                 
25 Goals are the objectives that regulators attempt to achieve with their policies.
Implementers are the individuals who are going to monitor the policy. Target groups are
the individuals or substances that a policy aims for. Instruments are the tools that
regulators have a their disposal to achieve those goals; examples include education,
funding, and legislature. Finally, the rationales are the logic that justifies the policy
(Rothmayr 2002).
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Goals
When creating policy, one should state their goals so others have an idea of what
is trying to be accomplished. The objectives for this anti-doping policy are two-fold:
firstly, in relation to general sports regulation, this policy intends to ensure that sport
remains a financial asset and retains its moral fibre. More specifically, it uses Bird and
Wagner’s (1997) approach; that is, it aims to “discourage doping in the first place; do so
without encouraging new drugs; and, do so with a minimum of off-the-field testing”
(Bird & Wagner 1997: 755).
Implementers
The three most likely implementers of anti-doping policy are: professional sports
associations (such as the NFL), international sports regulators (such as IOC or WADA),
and national governments. At present, regulation is being dominated by the first two
possibilities but national governments are starting to take an interest, because some
professional sports associations are not implementing or avoiding anti-doping legislation.
Although there is a degree of subjectivity in deciding who should have regulatory
power, doping should be regulated by international sports authorities such as WADA and
backed national governments financially and authoritatively. If WADA controlled
regulation, the banned substance list would be harmonized, and costs would be reduced.
However, if controlling PESs were a task exclusive to WADA, they would have an
enormous amount of power over professional sports associations, which is very trusting.
In order to combat the centralization of power, perhaps WADA could incorporate a panel
of representatives from both professional sports associations and government in order to
preserve balanced opinions.
Target Groups
Choosing target groups in policy is equally as important as choosing
implementers. In the field of anti-doping, there are several possible targets: the creators
of the PESs; the dealers of PESs; the sports associations; the teams within those
associations; the coaches; the individual athletes; and civil society. At present because of
the limited authority of those that control the issue of doping (making professional sports
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associations or international sport regulators), policy has typically been confined to
targeting athletes; however, if international sport regulators were backed by state
jurisdiction, a few more targets become visible. The following explains each possibility
and justifies who should be targeted.
Creators and Dealers
Dealers of PESs should be targeted. One of the most famous cases of dealing
PESs is the BALCO incident in San Francisco. When the case broke, regulators were able
to identify a potent new PES and received education about the latest form of steroids.
Furthermore, they were able to identify several athletes that had been linked to the lab.
However, it remains difficult to track these groups.
Athletes
In the end, athletes are responsible for what they ingest. However, this can be
problematic, since athletes are given so many substances that it can become impractical
for an athlete to question each one (as previously highlighted by Bonds). Although
legitimate cases of inadvertent doping occur (as illustrated by Alain Baxter), the athlete’s
argument of “I take so many substances I cannot remember” could also be a diversionary
argument. In response, if athletes have trouble keeping track of the substances they
ingest, they should not take so many. However, in order to be accommodating, sports
associations should have multiple resources available to help athletes avoid doping.
Society 
Finally, regulators should target society by educating them of the dangers of
PESs. If society is educated about the dangers of PESs and is presented with solid
justifications for why PESs harm sport, doping should subside. Currently, this plan is
being thrown into action with the Athletes Targeting Health Exercise and Nutrition
Alternatives programme (ATLAS and ATHENA – to be discussed), which is a nation-
wide anti-doping education program (Goldberg in McCloskey & Bailes 2005: 111-15).
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Instruments
As mentioned, the traditional instruments of anti-doping policy have been limited
because of lack to authority and limited capital; however, if sports regulators were backed
by national governments, a few other instruments become available. The following
section introduces some new addenda to policy and discusses how existing instruments
can be strengthened.
The Policy: A Focused, Harmonized, Negative List and Drug Diary
Although there is not much room for improvement on existing policy, there are a
few alterations that could be made to make policy more effective. Firstly, one of the most
important steps to reduce doping is harmonization: a single, universal anti-doping policy.
Currently this is the trend, as illustrated by many international sporting bodies adopting
WADA’s anti-doping policy and by federal bills being proposed in the US Congress.
Harmonization would once and for all draw a clear line of what is acceptable, thus giving
regulators another weapon to combat doping: stigmatisation.
In regards to the philosophical templates, the negative list is still the most
effective. The other alternatives discussed, such as a positive list or de-regulation, are not
practical in relation to anti-doping policy; however, the addendum of a drug diary would
be beneficial. Although drug diaries are an ineffective tool for regulating banned
substances, they are useful because they give regulators insight of an athlete’s intentions
and the substances they use. Additionally, they force athletes to think ethically about their
methods.
Drawing the line between acceptable and unacceptable substances is a difficult
and contestable exercise. No matter where the line is drawn, dopers use every substance
up to that line. Conversely, if the line is drawn at zero tolerance, monitoring bodies are
viewed as oppressive and the chance for inadvertent doping is increased26. In sum, it is
important that regulators set high standards, since it is the nature of athletes to push the
boundaries of acceptability (PESs or otherwise).
In regard to suspensions, the objective of regulating agencies should be to
severely punish dopers, especially for using serious PESs such as AAS or hGH.
                                                 
26 This is illustrated by the case of Alain Baxter.
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However, a doping conviction should not end an athlete’s career, especially in cases
where an athlete was deceived or unintentionally used an illegal substance. What
regulators need to remember is a two-year suspension has different implications
depending on the sport; perhaps regulators should dictate a player suspension based on
their estimated career length.
Education
In my opinion, the best deterrent against PESs is education. PES-education has
been slow in its development (largely due to the recent public awareness of PESs), but
that is rapidly changing with education being a primary goal of institutions like the
USADA.
Another anti-doping education program that is being used is ATLAS and
ATHENA (developed by Linn Goldberg, M.D. and Diane Elliot, M.D. at the Oregon
Health Science University). Their program is targeted at high school athletes and was
developed around the belief that deterrence via testing is not the best means to reduce
doping. Their anti-doping philosophy is well summarized in the following passage:
[In reference to testing high school athletes for PESs] No. 1, high school athletes
are not college athletes – they don’t have scholarships; they’re very different.
And there’s no [scientific] proof that NCAA testing reduces use. No. 2, you’re
going to isolate these kids further if you abandon them. They’ve got fragile
psyches. You’ll make them more depressed if you kick them off the team. . . The
last twenty years have taught us that scare tactics don’t work and role models
don’t work [without other means of reinforcements] (Goldberg in McCloskey &
Bailes 2005: 112).
He continues by stating:
In drug testing, you pay someone to come into your school and test your kids,
you’re not even involved. You don’t teach it, you don’t have to monitor it. All
you do is hire ‘Drug Testing Are Us’. You set up a contract with them, they come
in, they do testing, and they leave. You get the results and that’s it. ATLAS
involves coaches and team-mates. It involves changing social influence. Teams
work together; that’s what they’re designed to do. Most kids are on a team of
some kind. It’s a pro-social atmosphere (Goldberg in McCloskey & Bailes 2005:
114).
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I believe that Dr. Goldberg’s assertion is correct: education is relatively inexpensive and
pre-emptive. If high school athletes understand the dangers of misusing PESs before
being confronted by them, they are less likely to use them. However, the counter-
argument is that if kids are educated about PESs, they are simultaneously presented with
a wish-list for dopers. When presented with this dilemma, I believe education will reduce
doping more than it will encourage it.
As for cost, the Atlas program is relatively inexpensive in relation to testing. The
program costs US$4 per student and there is a coach’s manual that costs US$280. The
workbook is based on a ten-session curriculum. The program extends beyond doping to
teach children about healthy nutrition, using supplements correctly, and what to eat at fast
food restaurants. Accordingly, ATLAS has outstanding credentials: The Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration (of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services) named ATLAS an exemplary program. Furthermore, ATLAS is
recognized by the Department of Education’s, Safe and Drug Free Schools program, as
one of nine exemplary programs (McCloskey & Bailes 2005: 114).
In sum, ATLAS seems to be an ideal anti-doping education program. As of 2005,
it was being used by half of the high schools in America (McCloskey & Bailes 2005:
112); hopefully the program (or similar programs) will grow both within the United
States and worldwide, so athletes are educated about PESs before they encounter them.
Stigmatisation
As briefly mentioned, an advantage of having a harmonized policy is that it
allows regulators the ability to stigmatise. Currently, it is difficult to stigmatise dopers
because of the ambiguity and non-uniformity among anti-doping policies. However, a
harmonized anti-doping policy draws a definitive line of acceptability, thus allowing
regulators and society to stigmatise more effectively. This instrument might seem naïve,
but it is a method that has worked for drunk-driving campaigns:
A couple of decades ago, when drunken-driving deaths in America were
mounting at a terrifying rate but little public outcry was heard, a group of
mothers organized and began pressuring legislatures, law-enforcement bodies,
corporations and the mass media. In the 25 years since Mothers Against Drunk
Driving (MADD) drew a line and went to war, alcohol-related deaths have
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dropped by more than 40%, and since 1990 teen drunken-driving accidents have
diminished by nearly 60%. The mothers did it by stigmatising the behaviour
(Smith 2005: 48).
Although this does not prove that stigmatising will work for anti-doping policy, it
certainly merits an attempt.
Clinics
One step they have taken in Great Britain is anonymous clinics that help treat
those individuals who choose to use performance enhancing drugs. The Drugs and Sport
Clinic and Users Support Clinic (DISCUS) was created in 1995 in County Durham with
the objective of harm reduction rather than cessation of drug use. It has 450 clients
(mostly bodybuilders) and it provides “confidential and non-judgmental” service to users
of PESs. New clients are given a full check-up and their vital organs are continuously
monitored for danger signs. Clients are also encouraged and educated how to reduce
using PESs and still obtain their desired body type. The clinic even provides a
counselling service for those individuals who suffer from the side effects of PESs such as
sexual dysfunction or aggression (BMA 2002: 104).
Although some may argue that anonymous clinics encourage doping, since they
educate people how to use PESs; however, they also provide regulators cutting-edge
insight on doping. Furthermore, clinics allow medical professionals to monitor how PESs
affect the body, thus increase knowledge and avoid more serious health complications.
Similar clinics have already been established to cater to recreational drugs, so it does not
seem to a great leap to PESs. In sum, those athletes who wish to use PESs will use them
regardless of circumstances; therefore, regulators might as well provide a proper safe
house and gain insight to the world of doping.
Conclusion: A New Anti-Doping Policy
Harmonization, additional education, and stigmatisation are a few changes that
would improve anti-doping policy. In general, tangible policy is satisfactory at present,
but the anti-doping message would be more effective if society were further educated
about the physical and ethical ramifications of doping. One advantage that regulators
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have is that most current PESs have obvious health consequences; therefore, if regulators
build a strong case and ensure that the anti-doping message is heard, doping should
subside.
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Chapter V:
Conclusion
In close, this paper answered the stated purpose of explaining why there is
variance between professional and amateur anti-doping policies. In order to achieve the
primary objective, several other contributions were made: the paper also explained the
definitions, history, ethics, and implications surrounding anti-doping policy.
So what is my take on drugs in sport? I must admit that my opinion has shifted
back and forth a number of times over the course of writing this paper. At first, I felt
passionately that drugs in sport are unacceptable and should be expelled at all costs.
However, my idealism faded when I created my list of why doping should not be
regulated. Although I am still torn, I believe that doping needs to be regulated
aggressively. I think that if doping is not regulated, society is endangering the lives of
athletes and is undermining the moral foundations of sport.
I believe that the biggest risk that anti-doping regulators have to address is the use
of PESs in high school sports. High school athletes do not have the resources or
education to responsibly use these substances, as opposed to professional athletes who
do. Regulators need to get the anti-doping message to high school athletes so drug-free
habits will follow them through their sports careers.
As for the variation between professional and amateur anti-doping policies, I am
an advocate of a harmonized policy; this will likely need to occur by federal mandate. A
harmonized policy would get all athletes adhering to the same policy and would eliminate
confusion. Perhaps, it would have other spill-overs, like getting sports associations
discussing current substances and strategies. Many countries already have the
infrastructure in place to carry out this task via anti-doping associations.
Overall, I think the ideal anti-doping policy would balance two things: it would
discourage youth from using PESs and would allow athletes the freedom to use some
forms of enhancement to entertain fans.
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One last consideration is what technologies are going to arise in the future. In the
case of anti-doping policy, genetic technologies present a whole collection of
considerations. For example, gene doping will allow athletes to covertly increase
performance without any risk to health; these implications exponentially compound the
problems face regulators. If regulators are going to control genetic performance
enhancement, they need to get a head start by improving the implementation of current
anti-doping policies.
In closing, the field of anti-doping policy is a budding regulatory field. It is a field
that deals with many interesting and unprecedented problems. Due to sports popularity
and capital, doping needs to be dealt with intelligently and skilfully. Hopefully, PESs are
controlled in a way that protects the health of society while simultaneously allowing
athletes to achieve peak performance.
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Appendix
The following section provides the background knowledge of PESs for those who
are unfamiliar with their potential. The appendix also provides foresight into future PESs,
thus allowing the reader to anticipate future concerns. The topics covered in this section
include: some basic muscle physiology, a representation of current PESs, and future
genetic technologies.
Muscle Physiology
Muscles are not comprised of a single entity, but of many long cylindrical fibres,
similar in appearance to a box of straws. There are two types of these fibres: slow-twitch
and fast-twitch. Slow-twitch fibres can contract for long periods with little comparative
fatigue but are not as explosive as fast-twitch fibres. Slow-twitch fibres are conducive to
endurance sports, such as marathons, and long-distance cycling. Conversely, fast-twitch
fibres contract more forcefully than slow-twitch fibres, but cannot endure long periods of
contraction. They are necessary for explosive exercises like basketball and sprinting. An
interesting characteristic of fast-twitch and slow-twitch muscle fibres is that they can be
developed by certain training methods. In other words, muscles fibres are intelligent: they
recognize what types of muscle fibres are important to an athlete’s discipline and can
adjust to suit the conditions (Sweeney 2004: 64).
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Figure A.1 Sarcomere at Rest and Contracted
Source: Sweeney 2004
Each cell of muscle fibre is composed of myofibrils that are made up of
sarcomeres that are composed of two proteins: actin and myosin. The actin filaments
surround the elongated myosin filaments at either end. When the actin filament tightens
around myosin filament, the muscle is contracting. There is a great deal of force
generated during these contractions that could potentially be harmful to the sarcomeres;
therefore, there are fibre proteins that span the cell membrane that release the excess
force into a extracellular matrix outside the cell, thus protecting the sarcomeres.
Dystrophin is an example of one such fibre protein. Dystrophin’s protective capability is
Rest
Contracted
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not only limited to conducting force outside the cell membrane, it also works as a shock
absorber inside the cell membrane27. However, as with most moving parts, there is
inevitably some wear and tear that results from usage. In muscle fibres, the force
generated by the contracting and expanding sarcomeres can cause microscopic ruptures
in the muscle fibre, especially after doing vigorous exercise; this is registered in the brain
as muscle soreness (Sweeney 2004: 67).
Figure A.2: Normal Muscle Repair
________________________________________________________________________
Source: Sweeney 2004
Once the brain registers soreness, a chemical alarm is triggered that initiates tissue
repair. The body repairs muscle by building up existing muscles cells. A good way to
visualize this is the wrapping of duct tape on a stressed duct: the muscle combats the
stress by building up fibres, thus increasing its size and improving its strength28. In the
event of microscopic tears, local satellite cells – such as insulin-like growth factor 1
(IGF-1) – aid in the repair of the myofibrils. Once they arrive at a damaged area, the
satellite cells begin to replicate by normal cell division and then attach to the muscle cell,
thus adding their nuclei to the strand. The process of adding nuclei is regulated by pro-
growth and anti-growth mechanisms: the pro-growth mechanism being IGF-1 and the
                                                 
27 Dystrophin is the protein missing in Duchenne muscular dystrophy patients (Sweeney
2004: 67).
28 The building up of muscle fibres is why one’s muscles grow in size after continually
working out.
99
anti-growth factor being myostatin. The balance of IGF-1 and myostatin is the key to the
cure to muscular diseases such as muscular dystrophy; however, it also is the key to the
next revolution in doping. Altering IGF-1 and myostatin balance in muscles will occur
genetically and may be closer than many people realize; clinical trials, led by Lee
Sweeney, are already underway at the University of Pennsylvania (Sweeney 2004).
Existing Performance Enhancing Substances
The following section describes the different PESs, how they work, and some of
the ethical arguments that surround each technology. However, due to the hundreds of
different doping agents, the list is simplified and broken down into broad categories.
Although the following general categories dilute the scientific accuracy of each
technology, the implications remain the same and make understanding the various
technologies more manageable.
Existing performance enhancers fall into five main categories. First, rehabilitating
PESs help with the recovery of sore muscles. Secondly, muscle-builders actually aid the
body to build muscle mass. Thirdly, oxygen boosters are most applicable to endurance
athletes who gain advantage by an increase of oxygen in the bloodstream. Fourthly,
mental modifiers block pain or induce euphoria, thereby allowing competitors to push
their bodies harder without feeling discomfort. Fifthly, a ‘not otherwise specified’ (NOS)
category is given for those PESs that do not fit neatly into the other categories.
Muscle Rehabilitators
Muscle Rehabilitators are an expansive category; however, the common thread is
they either decrease discomfort or decrease recovery time for athletes. For example, pain-
killers are considered a rehabilitator since they allow an athlete to function more
comfortably.
A more contentious example of a muscle rehabilitator is creatine. Creatine is a
naturally occurring substance, which is found in the muscles of vertebrates such as meat
and fish. Creatine has two beneficial uses: it aids with muscle stamina and muscle repair;
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the body naturally uses it when muscles need repair29 (Mottram 2003: 286). The aspect of
creatine that makes some regulators uncomfortable is creatine-loading, where an athlete
ingests substances to help boost their creatine-reserve. The boost in creatine does not
increase an athlete’s overall strength like steroids; however, it does allow an athlete to
work out more rigorously and more often. As for side-effects, creatine increases an
athlete’s chance of cramping, and users are encouraged to ingest lots of water (ibid: 298).
Also, there is an argument that creatine increases injury proneness, since muscles strength
can potentially outgrow tendon strength, thus upsetting the natural balance of the body.
The ethical debate surrounding creatine is interesting. Sports purists argue that
because creatine shortens recovery time and allows an athlete to workout beyond a
natural capacity, it should be an illegal substance. Conversely, it can be argued that
athletes can receive the same benefits of artificial creatine by eating a creatine-rich diet
(ibid: 301).
Muscle-Builders
Of all of the first-generation performance enhancers, the most threatening to sport
are muscle-builders. Initially used by body-builders to aid in the body sculpting process,
muscle-builders have become a common PES used by athletes who seek enhancements in
explosiveness and power. This section introduces the two most prevalent classes of
muscle-builders: androgenic-anabolic steroids (AAS) and peptide hormones.
Androgenic-Anabolic Steroids (AAS)
AAS were first identified and isolated in the 1930s. They were primarily used to
promote a positive nitrogen balance in starvation victims and used in hormone
replacement therapy to treat those who had a deficiency in testosterone (Wadler 2003: 2).
It is rumoured that the first group to administer anabolic agents for its enhancement
effects were the Nazis. The Nazis administered AAS to soldiers, because they increase
stamina and aggression: two traits obviously beneficial to soldiers (Yesalis et al in
Lenehan 2003: 6). Even Hitler himself is said to have been injected with steroids (Taylor
                                                 
29 As previously explained, exercise results in microscopic tears of muscle; creatine helps
with the recovery.
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in Lenehan 2003: 6). Other early utilizations of AAS were treatments for cardiovascular
disorders and a “cure” for homosexuality (Lenehan 2003: 6-7)30.
According to Lenehan (2003), the effects of anabolic agents mimic those of
testosterone. Testosterone is a type of lipid that is synthesized in the adrenal cortex,
ovaries, or testes and is produced in the male testes and female ovaries; however,
testosterone production is higher in males than females. Testosterone has two main
effects: androgenic and anabolic. Androgenic effects encompass male secondary sexual
characteristics such as deepening of the voice and facial hair. Anabolic effects include the
growth and development of many of the body’s tissues, such as muscle, thus having
obvious implications for athletics.
During the discovery of androgenic and anabolic steroids, researchers initially
thought the two parts could be separated; therefore, it was believed that science could
increase muscle size without causing secondary male sexual characteristics. However,
further research proved that the two parts could not be separated. Improvements in
science allowed the production of synthetic steroids with suppressed androgenic
properties but not their complete eradication; therefore, the proper name for what is
commonly referred to anabolic steroids (or simply steroids) is androgenic-anabolic
steroids (AAS) (Lenehan 2003: 2). There are numerous health risks that are associated
with AAS, ranging from the shrinking of the testes, severe acne, and uncontrollable anger
(called roid rages) to liver problems, heart complications, cancer, and ultimately death
(ibid: 2).
Tetrahydrogestrinone (THG)
The most recent controversy involving a muscle-building substance is THG. THG
(or “the clear”) was created by Patrick Arnold and was distributed through the Bay Area
Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO). THG is infamous because it is a steroid that has been
modified to be virtually undetectable by traditional anti-doping tests, thus allowing
athletes to dope without being caught. THG is hard to detect because it breaks down
quickly when it dries out (Carroll 2005: 19); it was discovered in June of 2003 when
                                                 
30 Of course science now knows that homosexuality cannot be cured since it not a disease;
however, it was viewed as a disease during the pioneering days of AAS.
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Trevor Graham, a US track coach, sent a syringe of THG to the United States Anti-
Doping Agency (USADA) and told them it was a PESs. If this act of vigilance had not
occurred, it is possible that THG would still be unknown to anti-doping agencies. THG’s
ability to remain undetectable raises questions about how many other undetectable PESs
are available.
Oxygen Boosters
In endurance sports, where the principle cause of a decline in performance is the
lack of oxygen in the blood stream, oxygen boosting has become a common form of
performance enhancement. Oxygen is carried by red-blood cells; therefore, endurance
athletes try to boost red-blood cell count in an attempt to absorb more oxygen and reduce
fatigue. There are four basic methods of increasing the amount of oxygen in the
bloodstream: an athlete can train at high altitude to “naturally” increase red blood cell
count; an athlete can sleep in an oxygen tent (an oxygen depleted environment) to gain
the benefits of training at altitude; an athlete can blood dope (where an athlete trains at
high altitude, withdraws blood after the body has acclimatized, and re-injects the ‘high-
altitude’ blood before competing at a lower elevation); and, an athlete can take substances
such as the peptide hormone Erythropoietin (EPO) that artificially increases the amount
of red bloods cells (Cashmore 2000: 202).
Unsurprisingly, oxygen boosting has been the source of many recent ethical
debates. There is a solid argument for oxygen-boosting drugs (such as EPO) being
unethical: it is synthetic; and, it poses a health risk, since an increase of red-blood cells
makes blood viscous, thus leading to heart attacks. Alternatively, the problem of oxygen
tents and altitude training is more difficult to resolve. Ever since it was discovered that
training at high altitudes is advantageous in endurance competitions, it has been argued
that those athletes who train at high altitudes have an unfair advantage. Therefore, some
competitors argue that they should have the right to use altitude tents because it is not
invasive; however, there remains something unsettling about allowing athletes to sleep in
a tent that deprives them of oxygen.
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Mental Modifiers
Although not attracting the same kind of attention from the media as other PESs,
mental modifiers have impacted sport. This category includes three classes of cognitive
alteration: stimulants, narcotic analgesics and beta-blockers. The following section
briefly explains each class and its implications for sport.
Stimulants
Stimulants are drugs that boost alertness and reduce fatigue; examples of
stimulants are amphetamines, cocaine and caffeine (Meduna 2000: 4). Stimulants
enhance performance by increasing reaction time and give the user a slightly euphoric
feeling; however, there are health risks associated with stimulants including increased
heart-rate and addiction. Stimulants are applicable to most competitions and many
stimulants are legal in certain doses. However, international sports regulators such as
WADA feel that stimulant use has become uncontrollable in some cases. This can be
illustrated by a survey conduced of MLB by USA Today: of the 568 major leaguers who
responded, 87.2% said that amphetamine use exists and 35.3% said that at least half the
players use amphetamines (Hohler 2005: 2).
Narcotic Analgesics
Narcotic analgesics are drugs such as heroine, codeine and methadone that have
pain-killing effects. They have implications in all sports, because they help an athlete
compete when injured (Meduna 2000: 4). There have been substantial debates about
analgesics, since they do not directly enhance performance, but allow an injured athlete
to compete more comfortably when injured. However, some feel that they indirectly
enhance performance because an athlete can compete with no sense of pain. Furthermore,
due to the honour that accompanies an athlete while playing injured, and with the
acceptance of many types of analgesics within the medical community, there are wide-
ranging interpretations of the ethical status of analgesics.
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Beta-Blockers
Finally, beta-blockers such as Atenolol, Oxprenolol and Propranolol are drugs
that slow the heartbeat and steady movement. They have implications for athletic events
such as archery and shooting. Complications resulting from beta-blockers include a low
heart rate that could lead to fainting. Since they are only applicable to a handful of sports,
they are not highly scrutinized by anti-doping regulators (Meduna 2000: 4).
Not Otherwise Specified Substances (NOS)
There are a few other substances that, although they do not fit neatly into the
previous categories, do threaten the integrity of sport. Firstly, diuretics are drugs that
increase the frequency of urination, thus causing loss of water-weight. They are
especially popular among athletes who compete within a weight-class structure. Diuretics
have been around for years and are relatively unthreatening to health and integrity in
relation to other performance enhancers. Diuretics are also somewhat self-regulating,
because if they are abused, an athlete becomes weaker, therefore disadvantaged.
Another NOS performance enhancer that is becoming increasingly prevalent is
masking agents, which are designed to hide PESs from regulators. Masking agents have
recently become popular because they allow dopers to continue to use their favourite
illicit substances, even if regulators are able to test for that substance. This has created a
host of new problems for regulators because it extends the scope of banned substances:
regulators now have to test for both PESs and the agents that mask them.
A final substance that has interesting application is Forteo, which is drug that is
typically used to treat Osteoporosis in women; however, professional athletes are now
using it to heal bone fractures more quickly. Forteo has famously been used by Mark
Mulder (MLB) Terrell Owens (NFL) (Carroll 2005: 15).
Unknown Substances
As mentioned above, there are most likely to be other PESs on the black market
of which monitoring bodies are unaware. Sports Illustrated writer Will Carroll describes
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an encounter he had with an apparent legend of the underworld of PESs: Dr. X31. In the
article, Dr. X criticizes Jason Giambi for using the steroid “Deca”. “Here is this guy with
all of the money in the world who’s taking something you can find at Gold’s Gym? You
take Deca today and come back in 2006, and you’re gonna pop [test positive]. A guy on
my stuff could walk into the test with a needle in his ass and not worry” (Carroll 2005:
19). Dr. X continues to endorse his product by stating, “I know my stuff is the best out
there. I hear who’s working with who. I know who is winning”. Finally, he concludes
with a statement that strikes fear into the hearts of anti-doping regulators; “I know there’s
ten [PESs that regulators] don’t know about” (ibid: 19). The Dr. X article, coupled with
the THG saga, suggests that there are many PESs that are undetectable.
Genetic Performance Enhancement
Never before has society had the power to affect humanity in the way that is
possible with gene therapy. Not only does gene modification endanger the future of
athletics, it has the potential to split humanity. This section provides an in-depth analysis
of how genetic modification works and the ethical implications that surround it.
                                                 
31 The October 9, 2006 issue of Sports Illustrated leads me to believe that Dr. X may be
Patrick Arnold, who has recently been acknowledged as the creator of THG.
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Figure A.3: Genetic Muscle Enhancement
_____________________________________________________________
Source: Sweeney 2004
How Genetic Modification Works
Reverting back to the physiology section, the key to genetic performance
enhancement lies in the balance of IGF-1 and myostatin. It was originally hypothesized
that if the pro-growth hormone IGF-1 is injected directly into the muscle, the muscle
would grow; however, scientists discovered that when IGF-1 is directly injected, it
quickly dissipates. On the second attempt, scientists thought that if they introduced IGF-1
at a cellular level, the gene would last for the length of that cell’s lifespan. It was
concluded that the best way to present the IGF-1 gene is to co-introduce it with the help
of a virus; they decided to use adeno-associated virus (AAV) because it “infects human
muscle readily but does not cause any known disease” (Sweeney 2004: 66). According to
Sweeney (2004), the best way to conceptualise this process is to think of AAV as a
biological Trojan horse, because the gene penetrates the cell membrane with the aid of
the virus. Then once inside, the gene can have the desired effects.
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The results from clinical trials have been mind-boggling. Sweeney (2004)
reported, “after injecting this AAV – IGF-1 combination into young mice, [scientists]
saw that the muscle’s overall size and the rate at which they grew were 15 to 30 percent
greater than normal, even though the mice were sedentary” (Sweeney 2004: 66).
Furthermore, Sokolove stated that these mice “looked like a different animal. They were
built like cattle, with thick necks and big haunches, like they belonged in some sort of
mouse rodeo” (Sokolove 2004: 28). Even though Sweeney has not started human testing,
and the technology is being developed for patients with muscular dystrophy, the
implications for sport are obvious. Potentially, a professional athlete could add 30 percent
muscle mass without ever entering a gym.
Alpha-actinin-3 (ACTN3)
Not only have scientists discovered how to introduced modified genes into the
cells, but they have also discovered what genotype is principally responsible for athletic
ability. In August 2004, a group of Australian scientists discovered the genotype alpha-
actinin-3 (ACTN3). ACTN3 is an actin-binding protein, which influences the volume of
fast-twitch myofibres that generate force at high velocity (Yang et al. 2003: 1). This is
applicable for many sports such as basketball where the ideal body-type is both light and
powerful, so that players can achieve an enormous vertical leap and quickly change
direction. Although there are many external factors that determine the success of an
athlete, Australian scientists believe that 10 to 30 genes may be crucial in determining
athletic ability (Australasian Bioethics Information 2003: 28-9). Now that scientists have
discovered a way to introduce enhanced genes, and what gene types to focus on, it is only
a matter of time before the introduction of genetically modified athletes.
Types of Treatment
Unlike current performance enhancement that is limited to enhancing one
individual at a time, genetic enhancement has the capacity to affect athletics in many of
ways: firstly, there is the obvious application of increasing an athlete’s strength and speed
with such techniques as AAV – IGF-1 therapy. As previously discussed, genetic
enhancement could produce athletes of unprecedented physical ability. Before genetic
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enhancement this was the only type of enhancement possible; however, genetic
modification has many other applications.
Another application of genetic modification is germ-line therapy. Germ-line
therapy gives science the power to modify an individual’s progeny. Therefore, the
combination of genetic modification and gene-line therapy gives science the ability to not
only improve the performance of a single athlete, but could also improve an individual’s
offspring. This possibility raises serious questions, such as how do regulators handle an
athlete who was enhanced because their parents had gene therapy? Is that doping?
Moreover, genetic technology allows the owners of sports franchises to screen
athletes in-depth for injury proneness. However, just because a player is prone to injury,
does not make injury inevitable. The scenario was recently played out in the case of NBA
player Eddy Curry: In 2004-5, Curry experienced a “benign arrhythmia” that caused him
to miss the final 13 games of the regular season and playoffs for the Chicago Bulls.
Before signing him to an extension, the general manager for the Bulls, John Paxson,
required Curry to take a DNA test to see if he had a potentially fatal heart condition.
Citing an invasion of privacy, Curry refused the tests. Curry was subsequently traded to
the New York Knicks (Bulls Deal Curry…ESPN.com 2005).
Finally, the acceleration of injury recovery is possible with genetic technologies.
In addition to increasing recovery time of common sports injuries, such as muscle strains
and tears, a subsidiary of genetic technology called pluripotent stem-cells would allow
science to manufacture “every kind of human tissue, including muscle, bone and even
brain” (Wadler 2003: 7). Another prospect of genetic technology is that science could
repair an injury so that the injured body part is improved beyond its original ability.
These capabilities present ethicists with a difficult conundrum: on one hand, athletes have
the right to recover from injury quickly; on the other hand, it seems contradictory to the
nature of sport that season-ending injuries would cease to exist. Injuries have always been
part of sport and one of the most romantic aspects of sport is a reserve player performing
well in the vacancy of an injured starter. This raises the question: when genetic
technologies are available, should there be a minimum recovery period? In conclusion, a
genetically enhanced recovery leaves regulators with the conundrum of healing athletes
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quickly, but not too quickly; and, making sure they return to their natural level of ability
without being unfairly enhanced.
Testing Genetically Enhanced Athletes
Testing for genetically enhanced athletes poses a significant hurdle for monitoring
bodies. Because genetic modification occurs at a cellular level, current testing methods
such as blood and urine tests are ineffective. The only proposed means of discovering if
an athlete is gene doping is a muscle biopsy (Sweeney 2004: 69); however, it is uncertain
whether or not a muscle biopsy would definitely detect genetic manipulation. Moreover,
the muscle biopsy is substantially more invasive than blood and urine samples, thus
strengthening the case against it. Regardless of testing procedures and ethical decisions,
Lee Sweeney states, “preventing athletes from gaining access to them [genetic PESs]
could become impossible” (ibid: 63).
In conclusion, there are numerous puzzling ethical decisions related to genetic
performance enhancement. Regulators already are having a difficult time keeping pace
with first-generation PESs; therefore, the thought of regulating genetic PESs is daunting.
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